The cost to Type I workers of getting education level e is $4000 e. The cost to Type II workers of getting education level e is $2000*e. If the firm sets e* = 8, which of the following statements is true? Type I workers will not get e", but Type Il workers will get e*, which means there is a separating equilibrium. Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium. Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium. Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium. Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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Suppose there are two types of workers. Type 1 workers have a marginal product of labor
(MPL) = 1. That is, if a firm hires an extra Type I worker, that worker will produce 1 extra unit
of output. Type II workers have a MPL = 2. The firm can sell each extra unit of output for P
= $12,000.
Firms are unable to identify whether or not a worker is Type I or Type Il unless the worker
sends a signal of what type they are. The signal that workers can send is a level of
education, e. The firm adopts the following hiring strategy:
If e >e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $24,000.
If e < e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $12,000.
The cost to Type I workers of getting education level e is $4000*e. The cost to Type II
workers of getting education level e is $2000*e. If the firm sets e* = 8, which of the following
statements is true?
O Type I workers will not get e*, but Type II workers will get e*, which means there is a separating
equilibrium.
O Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium.
O Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium.
O Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium.
O Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium.
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose there are two types of workers. Type 1 workers have a marginal product of labor (MPL) = 1. That is, if a firm hires an extra Type I worker, that worker will produce 1 extra unit of output. Type II workers have a MPL = 2. The firm can sell each extra unit of output for P = $12,000. Firms are unable to identify whether or not a worker is Type I or Type Il unless the worker sends a signal of what type they are. The signal that workers can send is a level of education, e. The firm adopts the following hiring strategy: If e >e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $24,000. If e < e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $12,000. The cost to Type I workers of getting education level e is $4000*e. The cost to Type II workers of getting education level e is $2000*e. If the firm sets e* = 8, which of the following statements is true? O Type I workers will not get e*, but Type II workers will get e*, which means there is a separating equilibrium. O Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium. O Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a pooling equilibrium. O Both types of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium. O Neither type of workers will get e* which means there is a separating equilibrium.
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