already got a) b) c) plz answer d) e) f)!! (3) Consider a production of a good, X. The market for X is competitive and thus there aremany firms producing X. The production of X requires only labour inputs. Moreover, themarginal product of labour for X is constant. However, there are exactly two kinds of workersin the population. One kind has a constant marginal product worth $20 and the other kindhas a constant marginal product worth $15. The labour market is competitive and there areequal numbers of workers of each kind in the population.(a) Suppose that the price of X is $1 per unit. The equilibrium wage rate for high-productivity workers is $workers is $20and the equilibrium wage rate for low-productivity15(b) Consider the case of information asymmetry: each firm cannot directly tell the differencebetween the two kinds of workers. Even after it has hired them, it won't be able tomonitor their work closely enough to determine which workers are of which type. In thiscase, one wage rate will be offered to both kinds of workers, and the equilibrium wagerate will be $17.5(c) Suppose that a local college offers a course, which is unrelated to the productivity forproducing X. The high-productivity workers think that completing this course is just asbad as a $3 wage cut, and the low-productivity workers think it is just as bad as a $6 wagecut. Each firm can observe whether or not an individual worker completed the course. Ifsome workers come to a job interview with the certificate and the others come withoutthe certificate, then firms may be able to distinguish high-productivity workers fromlow-productivity workers. If this self-selection of workers really distinguishes workers,then the firm will offer $17to the workers with the certificate and $11to the workers without the certificate.(d) Now consider the workers' point of view. For high-productivity workers, what is thenet-payoff of completing the course and the payoff of not completing the course?(e) How about for low-productivity workers?(f) Based on (c), (d) and (e), explain whether the wage offer for those with the certificateand the wage offer without it will be an equilibrium, or not. Also, what do we call thistype of equilibrium?

Net payoff is the gain or the benefit after taking into account all the costs, expenses, and other…

(d) Now consider the workers' point of view. For high-productivity workers, what is the net-payoff of completing the course and the payoff of not completing the course? (e) How about for low-productivity workers? (f) Based on (c), (d) and (e), explain whether the wage offer for those with the certificate and the wage offer without it will be an equilibrium, or not. Also, what do we call this type of equilibrium?