(Harder) Can you come up with gross profit levels II and II such that for the unobservable effort case the principal will implement e=1 (that is will offer the optimal wage schedule for e=1) if there is no limited liability, but will implement e=0 when there is limited liability. For the values of gross profit levels you calculate, which effort level is socially optimal (which effort level would be implemented when effort is observable). Based on your answer, is it possible to have lower social surplus/welfare because of asymmetric information?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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(Harder) Can you come up with gross profit levels I and II such that for the
unobservable effort case the principal will implement e=1 (that is will offer the
optimal wage schedule for e=1) if there is no limited liability, but will implement e=0
when there is limited liability. For the values of gross profit levels you calculate,
which effort level is socially optimal (which effort level would be implemented when
effort is observable). Based on your answer, is it possible to have lower social
surplus/welfare because of asymmetric information?
Transcribed Image Text:(Harder) Can you come up with gross profit levels I and II such that for the unobservable effort case the principal will implement e=1 (that is will offer the optimal wage schedule for e=1) if there is no limited liability, but will implement e=0 when there is limited liability. For the values of gross profit levels you calculate, which effort level is socially optimal (which effort level would be implemented when effort is observable). Based on your answer, is it possible to have lower social surplus/welfare because of asymmetric information?
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