The average consumer at a firm with market power has an inverse demand function of P 10 - 2G The firm's total cost function is C = 5Q. If the firm engages in two-part pricing, what is the optimal fixed fee to charge each consumer? Multiple Choice $3.25 $1.25 $6.25 $2.45

The average consumer at a firm with market power has an inverse demand function of P 10 - 2G The firm's total cost function is C = 5Q. If the firm engages in two-part pricing, what is the optimal fixed fee to charge each consumer? Multiple Choice $3.25 $1.25 $6.25 $2.45

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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