The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1).Now answer the following problems.What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1?Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign.5|5What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1?Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign.100100 Consider the following two player extensive form game which was introduced in part 4 of this lecture as Ultimatum game. Here we consider themodification that the players are friends and the happiness of sharing has some utility which is added for both players.26A1,5 0,00,04,2 6,00,0The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1).Now answer the following problems.

Strategies (1,2,3,4,5) Both the individuals are rational and choose (5,1) as Nash equilibrium for…

The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1). Now answer the following problems. What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 5| What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 100 100

The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1). Now answer the following problems. What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 5| What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 100 100

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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