a. Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to ex- change their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes place. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player i ac- cepts an exchange if and only if the value v, does not exceed some threshold 0₁. b. How would your answer to (a) change if player j's valuation of player i's house were v? c. Try to explain why any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game de- scribed in (a) must involve threshold strategies of the type postulated in (a)
a. Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to ex- change their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange takes place. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player i ac- cepts an exchange if and only if the value v, does not exceed some threshold 0₁. b. How would your answer to (a) change if player j's valuation of player i's house were v? c. Try to explain why any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game de- scribed in (a) must involve threshold strategies of the type postulated in (a)
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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How would this exercise be solved step by step?
![12.7 Trading Places: Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player i values
his own house at vi. The value of player i's house to the other player, i.e., to
player j i, is 3v₁. Each player i knows the value v; of his own house to
himself, but not the value of the other player's house. The values v; are drawn
independently from the interval [0, 1] with uniform distribution.
a. Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to ex-
change their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange
takes place. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player i ac-
cepts an exchange if and only if the value v; does not exceed some
threshold 0;.
b.
How would your answer to (a) change if player j's valuation of player
i's house were {v;?
c.
Try to explain why any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game de-
scribed in (a) must involve threshold strategies of the type postulated
in (a).](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F69fa08bc-cf4d-4ae9-86a0-ace577fec6c6%2Ff221f1e9-7423-4763-a2d2-0e88b0e81ec8%2Fw2ez3q4_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:12.7 Trading Places: Two players, 1 and 2, each own a house. Each player i values
his own house at vi. The value of player i's house to the other player, i.e., to
player j i, is 3v₁. Each player i knows the value v; of his own house to
himself, but not the value of the other player's house. The values v; are drawn
independently from the interval [0, 1] with uniform distribution.
a. Suppose players announce simultaneously whether they want to ex-
change their houses. If both players agree to an exchange, the exchange
takes place. Otherwise no exchange takes place. Find a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this game in pure strategies in which each player i ac-
cepts an exchange if and only if the value v; does not exceed some
threshold 0;.
b.
How would your answer to (a) change if player j's valuation of player
i's house were {v;?
c.
Try to explain why any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game de-
scribed in (a) must involve threshold strategies of the type postulated
in (a).
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