Tastibite's BRF TASTIBITE'S PRICE Now suppose that in addition to differing in the amount of nuts each snack contains, Tastibite reduces the amount of sugar it uses in its snacks, thus increasing their appeal to more health-conscious consumers and decreasing their appeal to those primarily concerned with the taste. In this case, the resulting equilibrium price for both firms will be the price predicted when the products are only slightly differentiated. True or False: If consumers started caring more about product differentiation, the equilibrium price would move closer to marginal cost. O True False

Tastibite's BRF TASTIBITE'S PRICE Now suppose that in addition to differing in the amount of nuts each snack contains, Tastibite reduces the amount of sugar it uses in its snacks, thus increasing their appeal to more health-conscious consumers and decreasing their appeal to those primarily concerned with the taste. In this case, the resulting equilibrium price for both firms will be the price predicted when the products are only slightly differentiated. True or False: If consumers started caring more about product differentiation, the equilibrium price would move closer to marginal cost. O True False

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) - 40g Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by P= 190 -Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot compedtor. Calculate the Coumot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes as profes when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? (Round all quantities and dollar amounts to two decimal places) When competing, each firm will produce units of output. In tum, each firm will earn profit of $. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $10 and American had corntant marginal and average costs of S407 It Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $10 and American had constant marginal and average costs of S40, American would produceunits and Texas Air Corp. would produce units. In…
!
1.7. In Section 1.2.B, we analyzed the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. The case of homogeneous products
Suppose Mattel, the producer of Barble dolls and accessorles (sold separately), has two types of consumers who purchase Its dolls: low-value consumers and high-value consumers. Each of the low-value consumers tends to purchase one doll and one accessory, with a total willingness to pay of $44. Each of the high-value consumers buys one doll and two accessorles and Is willing to pay $82 In total. Mattel Is currently considering two pricing strategles: • Strategy 1: Sell each doll for $22 and each accessory for $22 • Strategy 2: Sell each doll for $6 and each accessory for $38 In the following table, Indicate the revenue for a low-value and a high-value customer under strategy I and strategy 2. Then, assuming each strategy is applied to one low-value and one high-value customer, indicate the total revenue for each strategy. Revenue from Low-Value Revenue from High-Value Total Revenue from Customers Customers Strategy $44 Value, 1 Accessory S82 Value, 2 Accessories (s) ($) (s) Strategy 1…
An industry consists of two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. The demand function for the product of each firmsis given by q1 = 720 - 3p1 + 2p2 and q2 = 720 - 3p2 + 2p1. We assume for simplicity that the totalcost of production is zero:TC1 =TC2 =0. a) Are these two products substitutes or complements? Assuming that firms compete over prices, find theprice best-response functions for firm 1 and fin 2. Draw a diagram that shows the BRFs and theequilibrium. Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? Find the Bertrand Nash equilibrium inprices and outputs. Obtain the profits of each firm. b) Show that the duopolists have incentives to collude. Find their joint profit-maximizing price, output, andprofit: find each firm's price. output and protit. Is collusion a Nash equilibrium? If not, what is the optimaldefection for each firm? Show this game in a 2X2 matrix form. What does this imply about the Nashequilibrium or the stability of their collusive agreement? Is it a Prisoner's Dilemma…
The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has a cost of production of C1= 15*Q1 and firm 2 has a cost of production of C2=20*Q2 a) Suppose that firm play a Stackelberg game. First firm 1 sets the quantity in t=1, then, knowing which quantityfirm 1 has set, firm 2 chooses the quantity in t=2. What are the Stackelberg quantities and prices? What arethe profits od firm 1 and 2? Compared to part a) which firm benefits and which firm loses?