(Table: Demand Schedule of Whatchamacallits) Use Table: Demand Schedule of Whatchamacallits. The market for whatchamacallits consists of two producers, Emma and Joshua. Each firm can produce whatchamacallits with no marginal cost or fixed cost. Suppose that these two producers have formed a cartel, agreed to split production of output evenly, and are maximizing total industry profits. If Emma decides to cheat on the agreement and sell 100 more whatchamacallits, Emma's profit will be and Joshua's profit will be Table: Demand Schedule for Whatchamacallits Price of a Quantity of Whatchamacallits Whatchamacallit Demanded $10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 a) $1,250; $1.250 b) $1,000; $1,400 c) $500; $500 d) $1,400; $1,000 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000

(Table: Demand Schedule of Whatchamacallits) Use Table: Demand Schedule of Whatchamacallits. The market for whatchamacallits consists of two producers, Emma and Joshua. Each firm can produce whatchamacallits with no marginal cost or fixed cost. Suppose that these two producers have formed a cartel, agreed to split production of output evenly, and are maximizing total industry profits. If Emma decides to cheat on the agreement and sell 100 more whatchamacallits, Emma's profit will be and Joshua's profit will be Table: Demand Schedule for Whatchamacallits Price of a Quantity of Whatchamacallits Whatchamacallit Demanded $10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 a) $1,250; $1.250 b) $1,000; $1,400 c) $500; $500 d) $1,400; $1,000 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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(Figure: Market Demand Curve I) The graph shows the market demand curve. Price (S) 40 35 2 28 24 20 16 12 36 32- 8 4- D 8 9 10 Quantity The equilibrium price in a Cournot duopoly with identical goods is $ a.8. b. 12 c.24 O d. 18.64 0 MC=AC MR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Coke and Pepsi dominate the cola market. Suppose that the marginal cost of making cola is $2. Assume also that the demand for cola is given by the following table: Price $8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Quantity 5 cans 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Suppose Coke and Pepsi both supply cola. They form a cartel and agree to cooperate on how much soda to produce. In this cartel case, how many bottles of cola would be sold? Type your answer...
2. During your next trip to the supermarket (or you may need to make a special trip) find two examples of different goods for which the market is oligopolistic. Make certain that you have chosen a â€˜goodâ€™ and not a brand name. Remember that several brand names compete in a market. List all the brand names (or at least four brands if there are dozens) and the parent company for each brand name (check the package carefully so that you donâ€™t confuse brand names with the actual producer.) For each good, what is your evidence that this market is oligopolistic? (number of producers; shelf space give to each one; identical pricing.)
(12) Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.
14. Aside from advertising, how can monopolisticallycompetitive firms increase demand for their products? 17. Would you expect the kinked demand curve to bemore extreme (like a right angle) or less extreme (like anormal demand curve) if each firm in the cartel producesa near-identical product like OPEC and petroleum?What if each firm produces a somewhat differentproduct? Explain your reasoning.
4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…
6. The cartel Consider a town in which only two residents, Rajiv and Simone, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Rajiv and Simone can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 0 0 5.50 45 247.50 5.00 90 450.00 4.50 135 607.50 4.00 180 720.00 3.50 225 787.50 3.00 270 810.00 2.50 315 787.50 2.00 360 720.00 1.50 405 607.50 1.00 450 450.00 0.50 495 247.50 0 540 0 Suppose Rajiv and Simone form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Rajiv and Simone agree to split production equally. Therefore, Rajiv's profit is $ and Simone's profit is $ Suppose that Rajiv and Simone have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of…
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3. Is monopolistic competition efficient? Suppose that a firm produces wooden train engines in a monopolistically competitive market. The following graph shows its demand curve, marginal- revenue (MR) curve, marginal-cost (MC) curve, and average-total-cost (ATC) curve. Place a black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the long-run monopolistically competitive equilibrium price and quantity for this firm. Next, place a grey point (star symbol) to indicate the minimum average total cost the firm faces and the quantity associated with that cost. ? PRICE (Dollars per engine) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 MC ATC MR 0 + Demand H 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 QUANTITY (Thousands of engines) Mon Comp Outcome Min Unit Cost Because this market is a monopolistically competitive market, you can tell that it is in long-run equilibrium by the fact that optimal quantity for each firm. Furthermore, the quantity the firm produces in long-run equilibrium is True or False: This indicates…
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1. The table below shows the percentage of sales held by the four largest firms in an industry. Company A B C D Market share (percent of sales) 12 10 5 3 a) Calculate this industry's four-firm concentration ratio. b) Is this industry competitive? why? c) What market type does it most likely represent?
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