Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 $247.50 5.00 90 $450.00 4.50 135 $607.50 4.00 180 $720.00 3.50 225 $787.50 3.00 270 $810.00 2.50 315 $787.50 2.00 360 $720.00
Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 $247.50 5.00 90 $450.00 4.50 135 $607.50 4.00 180 $720.00 3.50 225 $787.50 3.00 270 $810.00 2.50 315 $787.50 2.00 360 $720.00
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
![7. Breakdown of a cartel agreement
Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell
as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
Price
Quantity Demanded Total Revenue
(Dollars per gallon)
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
6.00
0
0
5.50
45
$247.50
5.00
90
$450.00
4.50
135
$607.50
4.00
180
$720.00
3.50
225
$787.50
3.00
270
$810.00
2.50
315
$787.50
2.00
360
$720.00
1.50
405
$607.50
1.00
450
$450.00
0.50
495
$247.50
0
540
0
Suppose Clancy and Eileen form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $
per gallon, and the total output
is
gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Clancy and Eileen agree to split production equally. Therefore, Clancy's profit is
$
and Eileen's profit is $
Suppose that Clancy and Eileen have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly
quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Clancy says to himself, "Eileen and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to
45 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."
to $
and Eileen's profit becomes S
After Clancy implements his new plan, the price of water
Clancy's profit becomes $
per gallon. Given Eileen and Clancy's production levels,
Because Clancy has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount, Eileen decides
that she will also increase her production to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount.
After Eileen increases her production, Clancy's profit becomes $
sum of the profits of Clancy and Eileen) is now $
Eileen's profit becomes $
, and total profit (the](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F5e16c761-999e-4331-b403-19eb5d0a4376%2F1c0cab1a-72a6-4c26-8a02-abadaba63db6%2For3kzdo_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:7. Breakdown of a cartel agreement
Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell
as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
Price
Quantity Demanded Total Revenue
(Dollars per gallon)
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
6.00
0
0
5.50
45
$247.50
5.00
90
$450.00
4.50
135
$607.50
4.00
180
$720.00
3.50
225
$787.50
3.00
270
$810.00
2.50
315
$787.50
2.00
360
$720.00
1.50
405
$607.50
1.00
450
$450.00
0.50
495
$247.50
0
540
0
Suppose Clancy and Eileen form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $
per gallon, and the total output
is
gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Clancy and Eileen agree to split production equally. Therefore, Clancy's profit is
$
and Eileen's profit is $
Suppose that Clancy and Eileen have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly
quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Clancy says to himself, "Eileen and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to
45 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."
to $
and Eileen's profit becomes S
After Clancy implements his new plan, the price of water
Clancy's profit becomes $
per gallon. Given Eileen and Clancy's production levels,
Because Clancy has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount, Eileen decides
that she will also increase her production to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount.
After Eileen increases her production, Clancy's profit becomes $
sum of the profits of Clancy and Eileen) is now $
Eileen's profit becomes $
, and total profit (the
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