Suppose that the monopolist can produce with total cost: TC 100. Assume that the monopolist sells its goods in two different markets separated by some distance. The demand curves in the first market and the second market are given by Q = 120-P and Q240 - 4P. if the monopolist can maintain the separation between the two markets, what price levels will prevail in each market, respectively? OP, = 55, P2 = 35 OP, = 55, P2 = 100 OP, = 60, P2 = 40 P= 65, P2 = 35

Suppose that the monopolist can produce with total cost: TC 100. Assume that the monopolist sells its goods in two different markets separated by some distance. The demand curves in the first market and the second market are given by Q = 120-P and Q240 - 4P. if the monopolist can maintain the separation between the two markets, what price levels will prevail in each market, respectively? OP, = 55, P2 = 35 OP, = 55, P2 = 100 OP, = 60, P2 = 40 P= 65, P2 = 35

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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