Suppose that the monopolist can produce with total cost: TC = 200. Assume that the monopolist sells its goods in two different markets separated by some distance. The demand curves in the first market and the second market are given by Q, product from cheaper location to a more expensive location at a certain cost. What would be the critical = 240-4P, and Q2 = 360-2P,. Suppose that consumers can mail the %3D mailing cost above which consumers do not have such an incentive? 40 O 55 60 50

Suppose that the monopolist can produce with total cost: TC = 200. Assume that the monopolist sells its goods in two different markets separated by some distance. The demand curves in the first market and the second market are given by Q, product from cheaper location to a more expensive location at a certain cost. What would be the critical = 240-4P, and Q2 = 360-2P,. Suppose that consumers can mail the %3D mailing cost above which consumers do not have such an incentive? 40 O 55 60 50

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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