Suppose that in the fast-food restaurant industry the four largest restaurants account for 30%, 20%, 15%, and 5% of the market share, respectively, and the 10 other small restaurants each account for 3%. If two of the 10 small restaurants merged, other things being equal, what would be the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). respectively? Select one: O a. 71%; 1640 O b. 70%; 1640 O c. 71%; 1658 d. 70%; 1658

Suppose that in the fast-food restaurant industry the four largest restaurants account for 30%, 20%, 15%, and 5% of the market share, respectively, and the 10 other small restaurants each account for 3%. If two of the 10 small restaurants merged, other things being equal, what would be the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). respectively? Select one: O a. 71%; 1640 O b. 70%; 1640 O c. 71%; 1658 d. 70%; 1658

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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