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6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler got away with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources to explain your answer.

6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler got away with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources to explain your answer.

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Background Information The Treaty of Versailles stated that although the Rhineland remained part of Germany, no German troops or any German fortifications were to be allowed there. Since coming to power in 1933, Hitler had been determined to reverse this situation. In 1935 France and the USSR signed a treaty of mutual support. Hitler claimed this treaty was hostile to Germany and hastened the development of secret plans for remilitarising the Rhineland. In 1936 Britain developed plans to offer Germany remilitarisation in exchange for arms limitations. However, on 7 March German troops marched into the Rhineland. There has been much disagreement about why Hitler was able to get away with this. Was it because he knew that Britain was sympathetic and would do nothing to stop him? SOURCE A Using as his excuse the French-Soviet Pact, Hitler sent a token force of 22 000 troops into the Rhineland. As they marched the inhabitants of German cities were at first stupefied and then jubilant. Laughing girls showered the soldiers with flowers. Many Rhinelanders expected the French to retaliate and the German Defence Minister was ashen-faced with anxiety. Hitler offered a 25-year non-aggression pact with France but that evening 15000 stormtroopers paraded in Berlin singing 'For today we own Germany and tomorrow the entire world'. This was exactly what the French feared. The French Prime Minister broadcast a reply. If acts like this were permitted, he said, there could be no peace; France would neither negotiate under menace nor let 'Strasbourg once again come again under the fire of German guns'. However, at this time concession was almost inevitable. Germany's occupation of the Rhineland was one of the most heavily telegraphed moves in Europe since 1918, yet French governments had made no plans to react and the government at the time was surprised. The French army was organised for defence and did not possess a single unit ready for combat. Most of the government ministers were equally passive and France's British ally could not accept the risk of war. However, what ultimately paralysed France was the state of public opinion. The vast bulk of the population were revolted at the prospect of another war. This was the most frequent comment heard on the streets of Paris, and seen in newspapers that the French rushed out to buy. 'Above all, no war,' announced 'L'Action Française'. SOURCE B From a history book published in 2000. SOURCE D I can tell you that for five days and five nights not one of us closed an eye. We knew that if the French marched, we were done. We had no fortifications, and no army to match the French. If the French had even mobilised, we should have been compelled to retire. Many army officers considered Hitler's action suicidal. During February the British were considering the dangerous question of the demilitarised zone, though no immediate German move was expected. As it became clear that Hitler would soon grab his prize, the British government began to think about using the Rhineland as a bargaining chip. The British government would abandon its commitments with regard to the Rhineland, in an agreement with Germany negotiated behind France's back. There does not seem to have been any real anxiety in the German High Command about the situation, despite Hitler's momentary loss of nerve on 5 March. The successful military coup was accompanied by a peace offer intended to emphasise the peaceful nature of the Rhineland occupation. Hitler achieved the full measure of surprise that he intended when the invasion took place on 7March. 22000 German soldiers entered the demilitarised zone. They were joined by paramilitary forces numbering some 14 000 who had been infiltrated earlier. The French Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the French people, asserted that Strasbourg would not be left under German guns. His resolute words fell flat. The reaction of French newspapers was remarkably calm, reflecting the mood of most of the French public. The French government agreed that France would not engage in isolated action but there were differences between France and Britain about the best policy to follow. In the belief that the French wanted firm action, the British government favoured quick condemnation of the German move and the early opening of talks (that is, strong words but no retaliation). When the French appealed to the League, Goebbels wrote in his diary on 7 March, 'France will involve the League. Fine! It will not act. Nothing else matters.' It soon became clear that there would be little pressure from League members for retribution. There was no promise of any participation in collective action. Hitler had every reason for confidence. Nor did the response of the League's members suggest that he would be challenged in the future. From a history book published in 2011. SOURCE C MUTUAL Back RUSSEL RUSSIA A German officer who worked at the time in army headquarters speaking about the German march into the Rhineland. He was speaking during the Spanish Civil War. Ring-Around-the-Nazi ! ASSISTANCE PACT FRANCE An American cartoon published in March 1936
Transcribed Image Text:Background Information The Treaty of Versailles stated that although the Rhineland remained part of Germany, no German troops or any German fortifications were to be allowed there. Since coming to power in 1933, Hitler had been determined to reverse this situation. In 1935 France and the USSR signed a treaty of mutual support. Hitler claimed this treaty was hostile to Germany and hastened the development of secret plans for remilitarising the Rhineland. In 1936 Britain developed plans to offer Germany remilitarisation in exchange for arms limitations. However, on 7 March German troops marched into the Rhineland. There has been much disagreement about why Hitler was able to get away with this. Was it because he knew that Britain was sympathetic and would do nothing to stop him? SOURCE A Using as his excuse the French-Soviet Pact, Hitler sent a token force of 22 000 troops into the Rhineland. As they marched the inhabitants of German cities were at first stupefied and then jubilant. Laughing girls showered the soldiers with flowers. Many Rhinelanders expected the French to retaliate and the German Defence Minister was ashen-faced with anxiety. Hitler offered a 25-year non-aggression pact with France but that evening 15000 stormtroopers paraded in Berlin singing 'For today we own Germany and tomorrow the entire world'. This was exactly what the French feared. The French Prime Minister broadcast a reply. If acts like this were permitted, he said, there could be no peace; France would neither negotiate under menace nor let 'Strasbourg once again come again under the fire of German guns'. However, at this time concession was almost inevitable. Germany's occupation of the Rhineland was one of the most heavily telegraphed moves in Europe since 1918, yet French governments had made no plans to react and the government at the time was surprised. The French army was organised for defence and did not possess a single unit ready for combat. Most of the government ministers were equally passive and France's British ally could not accept the risk of war. However, what ultimately paralysed France was the state of public opinion. The vast bulk of the population were revolted at the prospect of another war. This was the most frequent comment heard on the streets of Paris, and seen in newspapers that the French rushed out to buy. 'Above all, no war,' announced 'L'Action Française'. SOURCE B From a history book published in 2000. SOURCE D I can tell you that for five days and five nights not one of us closed an eye. We knew that if the French marched, we were done. We had no fortifications, and no army to match the French. If the French had even mobilised, we should have been compelled to retire. Many army officers considered Hitler's action suicidal. During February the British were considering the dangerous question of the demilitarised zone, though no immediate German move was expected. As it became clear that Hitler would soon grab his prize, the British government began to think about using the Rhineland as a bargaining chip. The British government would abandon its commitments with regard to the Rhineland, in an agreement with Germany negotiated behind France's back. There does not seem to have been any real anxiety in the German High Command about the situation, despite Hitler's momentary loss of nerve on 5 March. The successful military coup was accompanied by a peace offer intended to emphasise the peaceful nature of the Rhineland occupation. Hitler achieved the full measure of surprise that he intended when the invasion took place on 7March. 22000 German soldiers entered the demilitarised zone. They were joined by paramilitary forces numbering some 14 000 who had been infiltrated earlier. The French Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the French people, asserted that Strasbourg would not be left under German guns. His resolute words fell flat. The reaction of French newspapers was remarkably calm, reflecting the mood of most of the French public. The French government agreed that France would not engage in isolated action but there were differences between France and Britain about the best policy to follow. In the belief that the French wanted firm action, the British government favoured quick condemnation of the German move and the early opening of talks (that is, strong words but no retaliation). When the French appealed to the League, Goebbels wrote in his diary on 7 March, 'France will involve the League. Fine! It will not act. Nothing else matters.' It soon became clear that there would be little pressure from League members for retribution. There was no promise of any participation in collective action. Hitler had every reason for confidence. Nor did the response of the League's members suggest that he would be challenged in the future. From a history book published in 2011. SOURCE C MUTUAL Back RUSSEL RUSSIA A German officer who worked at the time in army headquarters speaking about the German march into the Rhineland. He was speaking during the Spanish Civil War. Ring-Around-the-Nazi ! ASSISTANCE PACT FRANCE An American cartoon published in March 1936
SOURCE E We had discovered that our policy of condemning the German action and then developing a constructive policy to re-establish the European situation had no chance of acceptance with France, Belgium or Italy. It was inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention - to ask the Council of the League to make a pronouncement. Then, if Germany was still obdurate, they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case, we should have to decide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation - and we should be in an impossible position if we refused. The Prime Minister thought it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action they proposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Communist. Our position at home and in home waters is a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of view of the navy, army or air force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was strongly opposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. In these circumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escape from military action. SOURCE F From a record of a meeting of the British Government shortly after German troops marched into the Rhineland There is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities. The German government speak of their 'unchangeable longing for peace in Europe' and state a willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium. SOURCE G From a speech in the House of Commons by Anthony Eden shortly after German troops marched into the Rhineland. Eden was in charge of British Foreign Policy. GERMANICA PAX Ernant Hoshypour THE GOOSE-STEP "GOOSEY GOOSEY GANDER, WHITHER DOST THOU WANDER?" "ONLY THROUGH THE RHINELAND- PRAY EXCUSE MY BLUNDER!" A British cartoon, March 1936. 'Pax Germanica' means 'German Peace' 6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler got away with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources to explain your answer. SOURCE H 7 A photograph of German troops riding into the Rhineland on 7th March 1936
Transcribed Image Text:SOURCE E We had discovered that our policy of condemning the German action and then developing a constructive policy to re-establish the European situation had no chance of acceptance with France, Belgium or Italy. It was inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention - to ask the Council of the League to make a pronouncement. Then, if Germany was still obdurate, they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case, we should have to decide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation - and we should be in an impossible position if we refused. The Prime Minister thought it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action they proposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Communist. Our position at home and in home waters is a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of view of the navy, army or air force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was strongly opposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. In these circumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escape from military action. SOURCE F From a record of a meeting of the British Government shortly after German troops marched into the Rhineland There is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities. The German government speak of their 'unchangeable longing for peace in Europe' and state a willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium. SOURCE G From a speech in the House of Commons by Anthony Eden shortly after German troops marched into the Rhineland. Eden was in charge of British Foreign Policy. GERMANICA PAX Ernant Hoshypour THE GOOSE-STEP "GOOSEY GOOSEY GANDER, WHITHER DOST THOU WANDER?" "ONLY THROUGH THE RHINELAND- PRAY EXCUSE MY BLUNDER!" A British cartoon, March 1936. 'Pax Germanica' means 'German Peace' 6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler got away with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources to explain your answer. SOURCE H 7 A photograph of German troops riding into the Rhineland on 7th March 1936
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