Section 1 Answer all questions. Show all your workings. (a) Suppose there are two firms 1 and 2, whose abatement costs are given by c₁(e₁) and c₂ (e₂), where e denotes emissions and subscripts denote the firm. We assume that c{(e;) < 0; c{' (e;) > 0 for i = 1,2 and for any level of emission e we have c₁'(e) # c₂'(e). Furthermore, assume the two firms make different contributions towards pollution concentration in a nearby river captured by the transfer coefficients ε₁ and 2 such that for any level of emission e we have 2(e) +2 The regulator does not know the resulting C₁'(e) Τι environmental damages. Using an analytical approach explain carefully how the regulator may limit the concentration of pollution using (i) a Pigouvian tax scheme and (ii) uniform emissions standards. Discuss the cost-effectiveness of both approaches to control pollution. [200 marks] (b) "Whether the regulator sells or gives away tradeable emission permits free of charge, the quantities of emissions produced by firms are the same." Assume that there are n identical profit-maximising firms where profit for each firm is given by π(e) with л'(e) > 0; π"(e) < 0 and e denotes emissions. Individual emissions summed over all firms gives Ę which generates environmental damages D(E). Show that the regulator achieves the optimal level of total pollution through a tradeable emission permit scheme, where the permits are distributed according to the following cases: Case (i) the firm purchases all permits; Case (ii) the firm receives all permits free; and Page 3 of 5 ES30031 Case (iii) the firm purchases a portion of its permits and receives the remainder free of charge.
Section 1 Answer all questions. Show all your workings. (a) Suppose there are two firms 1 and 2, whose abatement costs are given by c₁(e₁) and c₂ (e₂), where e denotes emissions and subscripts denote the firm. We assume that c{(e;) < 0; c{' (e;) > 0 for i = 1,2 and for any level of emission e we have c₁'(e) # c₂'(e). Furthermore, assume the two firms make different contributions towards pollution concentration in a nearby river captured by the transfer coefficients ε₁ and 2 such that for any level of emission e we have 2(e) +2 The regulator does not know the resulting C₁'(e) Τι environmental damages. Using an analytical approach explain carefully how the regulator may limit the concentration of pollution using (i) a Pigouvian tax scheme and (ii) uniform emissions standards. Discuss the cost-effectiveness of both approaches to control pollution. [200 marks] (b) "Whether the regulator sells or gives away tradeable emission permits free of charge, the quantities of emissions produced by firms are the same." Assume that there are n identical profit-maximising firms where profit for each firm is given by π(e) with л'(e) > 0; π"(e) < 0 and e denotes emissions. Individual emissions summed over all firms gives Ę which generates environmental damages D(E). Show that the regulator achieves the optimal level of total pollution through a tradeable emission permit scheme, where the permits are distributed according to the following cases: Case (i) the firm purchases all permits; Case (ii) the firm receives all permits free; and Page 3 of 5 ES30031 Case (iii) the firm purchases a portion of its permits and receives the remainder free of charge.
Micro Economics For Today
10th Edition
ISBN:9781337613064
Author:Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.
Chapter14: Environmental Economics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 17SQ
Related questions
Question
![Section 1
Answer all questions. Show all your workings.
(a) Suppose there are two firms 1 and 2, whose abatement costs
are given by c₁(e₁) and c₂ (e₂), where e denotes emissions and
subscripts denote the firm.
We assume that c{(e;) < 0; c{' (e;) > 0 for i = 1,2 and for any
level of emission e we have c₁'(e) # c₂'(e).
Furthermore, assume the two firms make different contributions
towards pollution concentration in a nearby river captured by the
transfer coefficients ε₁ and 2 such that for any level of emission
e we have 2(e) +2 The regulator does not know the resulting
C₁'(e) Τι
environmental damages. Using an analytical approach explain
carefully how the regulator may limit the concentration of
pollution using (i) a Pigouvian tax scheme and (ii) uniform
emissions standards. Discuss the cost-effectiveness of both
approaches to control pollution.
[200 marks]
(b) "Whether the regulator sells or gives away tradeable emission
permits free of charge, the quantities of emissions produced by
firms are the same."
Assume that there are n identical profit-maximising firms where
profit for each firm is given by π(e) with л'(e) > 0; π"(e) <
0 and e denotes emissions. Individual emissions summed over
all firms gives Ę which generates environmental damages
D(E). Show that the regulator achieves the optimal level of total
pollution through a tradeable emission permit scheme, where
the permits are distributed according to the following cases:
Case (i) the firm purchases all permits;
Case (ii) the firm receives all permits free; and
Page 3 of 5
ES30031
Case (iii) the firm purchases a portion of its permits and receives
the remainder free of charge.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Ff8bd2093-7cc8-412e-99d0-d186b683ea2e%2F02bc3de3-22c8-41ae-9e22-7c1832474cd8%2Fjxtefv_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Section 1
Answer all questions. Show all your workings.
(a) Suppose there are two firms 1 and 2, whose abatement costs
are given by c₁(e₁) and c₂ (e₂), where e denotes emissions and
subscripts denote the firm.
We assume that c{(e;) < 0; c{' (e;) > 0 for i = 1,2 and for any
level of emission e we have c₁'(e) # c₂'(e).
Furthermore, assume the two firms make different contributions
towards pollution concentration in a nearby river captured by the
transfer coefficients ε₁ and 2 such that for any level of emission
e we have 2(e) +2 The regulator does not know the resulting
C₁'(e) Τι
environmental damages. Using an analytical approach explain
carefully how the regulator may limit the concentration of
pollution using (i) a Pigouvian tax scheme and (ii) uniform
emissions standards. Discuss the cost-effectiveness of both
approaches to control pollution.
[200 marks]
(b) "Whether the regulator sells or gives away tradeable emission
permits free of charge, the quantities of emissions produced by
firms are the same."
Assume that there are n identical profit-maximising firms where
profit for each firm is given by π(e) with л'(e) > 0; π"(e) <
0 and e denotes emissions. Individual emissions summed over
all firms gives Ę which generates environmental damages
D(E). Show that the regulator achieves the optimal level of total
pollution through a tradeable emission permit scheme, where
the permits are distributed according to the following cases:
Case (i) the firm purchases all permits;
Case (ii) the firm receives all permits free; and
Page 3 of 5
ES30031
Case (iii) the firm purchases a portion of its permits and receives
the remainder free of charge.
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