Scenario 17.5 Consider the following information: Income to the firm from workers who sell door-to-door Bad Luck Good Luck Low Effort (e = :0) $5,000 $7,000 High Effort (e = 1) $7,000 $13,000 Cost of effort: c = $2500e Probabilities: Bad luck = .75; Good luck = .25 A principal-agent problem arises in the situation in Scenario 17.5 because: O the principal can measure effort and output; the agent can measure only output. O the principal can measure only effort, and the agent can measure only output. the principal can measure only output, and the agent can measure effort and output. neither the principal nor the agent can measure effort. O neither the principal nor the agent can measure output.
Scenario 17.5 Consider the following information: Income to the firm from workers who sell door-to-door Bad Luck Good Luck Low Effort (e = :0) $5,000 $7,000 High Effort (e = 1) $7,000 $13,000 Cost of effort: c = $2500e Probabilities: Bad luck = .75; Good luck = .25 A principal-agent problem arises in the situation in Scenario 17.5 because: O the principal can measure effort and output; the agent can measure only output. O the principal can measure only effort, and the agent can measure only output. the principal can measure only output, and the agent can measure effort and output. neither the principal nor the agent can measure effort. O neither the principal nor the agent can measure output.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
![Scenario 17.5
Consider the following information:
Income to the firm from workers who sell door-to-door
Bad Luck
Good Luck
Low Effort (e = :0)
$5,000
$7,000
High Effort (e = 1)
$7,000
$13,000
Cost of effort: c = $2500e
Probabilities: Bad luck = .75; Good luck = .25
A principal-agent problem arises in the situation in Scenario 17.5 because:
O the principal can measure effort and output; the agent can measure only output.
O the principal can measure only effort, and the agent can measure only output.
the principal can measure only output, and the agent can measure effort and output.
neither the principal nor the agent can measure effort.
O neither the principal nor the agent can measure output.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F4c7d3cd3-3cf6-40c4-9382-922e677df74e%2F12cf2ee0-c817-4da9-8732-998e4648b619%2Fsfwyx58_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Scenario 17.5
Consider the following information:
Income to the firm from workers who sell door-to-door
Bad Luck
Good Luck
Low Effort (e = :0)
$5,000
$7,000
High Effort (e = 1)
$7,000
$13,000
Cost of effort: c = $2500e
Probabilities: Bad luck = .75; Good luck = .25
A principal-agent problem arises in the situation in Scenario 17.5 because:
O the principal can measure effort and output; the agent can measure only output.
O the principal can measure only effort, and the agent can measure only output.
the principal can measure only output, and the agent can measure effort and output.
neither the principal nor the agent can measure effort.
O neither the principal nor the agent can measure output.
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