RobbinGood sells financial trades to retail traders (r) and institutional traders (i) whose demand curves for financial trades are given by the following equations Demand (r): Q, = 1000 - 70P, Demand (i): Q: = (1000/6)- (70/6)P, thousand trades thousand trades and the marginal cost is a constant $1 per trade for either kind of trader. Suppose RobbinGood decides to set one price for each group, and maximize profits accordingly. Then, RobbinGood will sell[ Answer66A | thousands of trades to retail traders at a price of $[ Answer66B] per trade.

RobbinGood sells financial trades to retail traders (r) and institutional traders (i) whose demand curves for financial trades are given by the following equations Demand (r): Q, = 1000 - 70P, Demand (i): Q: = (1000/6)- (70/6)P, thousand trades thousand trades and the marginal cost is a constant $1 per trade for either kind of trader. Suppose RobbinGood decides to set one price for each group, and maximize profits accordingly. Then, RobbinGood will sell[ Answer66A | thousands of trades to retail traders at a price of $[ Answer66B] per trade.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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