Rice Corporation offers to sell Sushi Restaurants, Inc., five hundred bushels of rice. Sushi responds, "We agree to buy five hundred bushels only if the rice is Grade A quality." Without more, their contract is formed according to O a. the terms of the original offer. O b. none of the terms. O c. the new terms of the acceptance. O d. whatever is reasonable.

Rice Corporation offers to sell Sushi Restaurants, Inc., five hundred bushels of rice. Sushi responds, "We agree to buy five hundred bushels only if the rice is Grade A quality." Without more, their contract is formed according to O a. the terms of the original offer. O b. none of the terms. O c. the new terms of the acceptance. O d. whatever is reasonable.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Explain all option compulsary......you will not explain all option then I will give you down upvote...
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