Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 432 - 7 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1 = 8 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 5 Q. (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 90 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 103 .) What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ? hint: 8597.86

Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 432 - 7 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1 = 8 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 5 Q. (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 90 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 103 .) What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ? hint: 8597.86

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11SQP

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Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 432 - 7 Qb.

The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1 = 8 Q.

The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 5 Q.

(Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 90 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 103 .)

What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ?

hint: 8597.86

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