Question 5 Cost data of a machine is shown in the following table with an annual rate of 12%. Calculate annual worth at end of year 2. M&O cost Retention Yr. Market Value per year O (First Cost) 55,000 1 35,000 45,000 20,000 47,500 15,000 50,000 2,000 53,500 O 63,256 O 69,289 O 68,476 O 67,854 Question 6 Use same cost data from last question and 12% annual rate of return. Calculate annual worth at end of Year 3. O 65,765 O 64,332 67.428 O 66,256 Question 7

Question 5 Cost data of a machine is shown in the following table with an annual rate of 12%. Calculate annual worth at end of year 2. M&O cost Retention Yr. Market Value per year O (First Cost) 55,000 1 35,000 45,000 20,000 47,500 15,000 50,000 2,000 53,500 O 63,256 O 69,289 O 68,476 O 67,854 Question 6 Use same cost data from last question and 12% annual rate of return. Calculate annual worth at end of Year 3. O 65,765 O 64,332 67.428 O 66,256 Question 7

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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