Question 35 Suppose there are 3 firms in a market. The largest firm has sales of $60 million and each of the other two firms has sales of $25 million. The Herfindal-Hirshman Index of this industry is: 2,500 3,750 2,550 4008

Question 35 Suppose there are 3 firms in a market. The largest firm has sales of $60 million and each of the other two firms has sales of $25 million. The Herfindal-Hirshman Index of this industry is: 2,500 3,750 2,550 4008

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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(a) Suppose Fiat recently entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with Case for $4.3 billion. Prior to the merger, the market for four-wheel-drive tractors consisted of five firms. The market was highly concentrated, with a Herfindahl- Hirschman index of 2,765. Case's share of that market was 22 percent, while Fiat comprised just 12 percent of the market. If approved, by how much would the postmerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index increase?
You are the manager in a market composed of 12 firms, each of which has a 8.33 percent market share. In addition, each firm has a strong financial position and is located within a 100-mile radius of its competitors. Instructions: Enter your responses rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places). a. Calculate the premerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for this market. b. Suppose that any two of these firms merge. What is the postmerger HHI? c. Based only on the information contained in this question and on the U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines described in this chapter, do you think the Justice Department would attempt to block a merger between any two of the firms? O It may but will also consider other factors O It likely will not O It likely will
QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)
PQ 18.02 (and 18.03) Two businesses in a market can decide to increase the amount of stores they operate. If neither business adds new stores they will each earn $10 million in profit; if both add new stores they will each earn $4 million in profit; and if one adds new stores while the other does not, the business adding new stores earns profit of $10 million and the other earns profit of $5 million. If these businesses are not colluding we would expect: Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. a both may or may not add new stores. b one business will add new stores and the other will not. c both will add new stores. d neither will add new stores.
MCQ 27 Consider the following game in which two firms (OLD and NEW) are considering whether or not to advertise to increase sales. Each firm knows that the impact on profits depends on what the other firm chooses to do. The possible profit outcomes of the game are shown below, with OLD's profits shown as the first number in each pair and NEW's profits shown as the second number: NEW Advertise Not Advertise Advertise 10, 5 15, 1 OLD Not Advertise 5, 8 20, 3 Assuming the firms aim to earn as much profit as possible, which of the following is TRUE for the game? A I do not want to answer this question. OLD's dominant strategy is to advertise C OLD's dominant strategy is not to advertise NEW's dominant strategy is not to advertise E NEW's dominant strategy is to advertise F the dominant strategy for both OLD and NEW is to advertise
• The Chinese government has created a fund worth more than 20 trillion won to foster the semiconductor industry. Although there is a large technological difference between memory semiconductors, system semiconductors can be developed in a short period of time. The number of companies producing homogeneous quality products has increased. • Question (a) In the Cournot game, when the number of firms increases from 2 to n, compare the output, total output, and profit of each firm with N.E. in the Cournot model. • Question (b) If the number of companies participating in the semiconductor market increases to infinity, that is, in a perfectly competitive market, what will be the equilibrium point?
Question 24 2 pts Assume an industry has 18 fırms. Top two firms have the market share 10 percent each and rest of the sixteen firms have market shares 5 percent each. Herfindahl index in this industry is equal to Question 25 2 pts Assume an industry has 18 fırms. Top two firms have the market share 10 percent each and rest of the sixteen fırms have market shares 5 percent each. Four-firms concentration ratio in this industry is equal to
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Suppose Fiat recently entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with Case for $4.3 billion. Prior to the merger, the market for four-wheel-drive tractors consisted of five firms. The market was highly concentrated, with a Herfindahl- Hirschman index of 2,650. Case's share of that market was 18 percent, while Fiat comprised just 9 percent of the market. If approved, by how much would the postmerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index increase? Based only on this information, is the Justice Department likely to challenge the merger according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines? Possibly - but other factors will be considered Yes Ο NO
Q2) Is it possible for a firm in an oligopolistic market to make a product differentiation. If yes, please explain by providing example. If not, please explain why it is not possible.
What is the, HHI, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for an industry where six companies each have a market share of 15% and one company which has a market share of 10%?
The table below shows market share data for different firms producing desks. Market Share in % 15 18 7 11 6 10 4 5 5 16 Firm Aardvark Inc Baluga, LLC Cran Inc Delta Co Echo Co Farriss Co Gum Drop Inc Hill Corp Indigo Corp Jackson Co What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for this market? ← HHI 225 324 49 121 36 100 16 25 25 256 Suppose that Delta Co and Gum Drop Inc are considering a merger. What will the HHI be after this merger?