Part 1 Consider the following game between two early settlers in the United States: Settler 2 Move West Move North Move West 60, 110 100, 140 Settler 1 Move North 70, 130 90, 100 Which of the following is true? Choose one: O A. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move west. O B. Neither settler has a dominant strategy. O.Only settler 1 has a dominant strategy. O D. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move north. O E. Only settler 2 has a dominant strategy. Part 2 Considering the payoff matrix in the game above, Choose one: O A. there are two equilibria, when one moves west the other moves north (and vice versa). O B. there are no equilibria. O C. there is one equilibrium, for both to move north. O D. there is one equilibrium, for both to move west.

Part 1 Consider the following game between two early settlers in the United States: Settler 2 Move West Move North Move West 60, 110 100, 140 Settler 1 Move North 70, 130 90, 100 Which of the following is true? Choose one: O A. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move west. O B. Neither settler has a dominant strategy. O.Only settler 1 has a dominant strategy. O D. Both settlers have the same dominant strategy: move north. O E. Only settler 2 has a dominant strategy. Part 2 Considering the payoff matrix in the game above, Choose one: O A. there are two equilibria, when one moves west the other moves north (and vice versa). O B. there are no equilibria. O C. there is one equilibrium, for both to move north. O D. there is one equilibrium, for both to move west.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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