Mixed Nash Equilibrium Player 2 A 5,1 1,3 В 2,6 4,2 PLAYER 1 a) calculate the probability In equilibrium Player 1 chooses A with probability a= [?] and player 2 chooses M with probability B = [ ?] b) calculate payoff for mixed strategy nash equilibrium Player 1 gets payoff of [?] Player 2 gets payoff of [?] c) Suppose the payoff for (B,C) would change to (0,8) Would probability a increase,decrease, stay the same? Would probability B increase,decrease, stay the same?

Mixed Nash Equilibrium Player 2 A 5,1 1,3 В 2,6 4,2 PLAYER 1 a) calculate the probability In equilibrium Player 1 chooses A with probability a= [?] and player 2 chooses M with probability B = [ ?] b) calculate payoff for mixed strategy nash equilibrium Player 1 gets payoff of [?] Player 2 gets payoff of [?] c) Suppose the payoff for (B,C) would change to (0,8) Would probability a increase,decrease, stay the same? Would probability B increase,decrease, stay the same?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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