Ming lives in Seattle and recently bought a $125 ticket to attend a Seattle Seahawks game. He is a huge fan, so even though the ticket is pricey it is well below his willingness to pay of $250. However, as game day approaches, Ming receives an invitation from his friend, Cassandra, to spend the day at the Museum of Pop Culture touring a big exhibit on Marvel superheroes. The museum visit would only cost $75, but Ming (being a big Marvel fan too) would be willing to pay $150. What is his Opportunity cost of going to the Seattle Seahawks game? Ming's total opportunity cost of going to the Seattle Seahawks game is $ (Enter a numeric response using an integer)

Ming lives in Seattle and recently bought a $125 ticket to attend a Seattle Seahawks game. He is a huge fan, so even though the ticket is pricey it is well below his willingness to pay of $250. However, as game day approaches, Ming receives an invitation from his friend, Cassandra, to spend the day at the Museum of Pop Culture touring a big exhibit on Marvel superheroes. The museum visit would only cost $75, but Ming (being a big Marvel fan too) would be willing to pay $150. What is his Opportunity cost of going to the Seattle Seahawks game? Ming's total opportunity cost of going to the Seattle Seahawks game is $ (Enter a numeric response using an integer)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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