8:07 union. Instead, they see in Boeing's recent moves--the executive firings, the drive to outsource, the push into services--not the creation of a vibrant new business culture but the dismantling of one of the most successful engineering cultures of all time. "The motivator is fear and intimidation," says one unionist. Harry Stonecipher, the past head of McDonnell Douglas who had come in as the new chief operating officer of Boeing after the company was acquired, was announced as the new CEO after Condit's resignation. His first important decision was regarding the new 7E7 planes, which would be Boeing's first new plane in a decade. Later, Stonecipher announced that Boeing was to go ahead with the production of the 7E7 jets. Stonecipher promised to work closely with unions to see how morale is reversed and that the planes are produced at a quicker pace and for less money. Despite Stonecipher's best effort, critics are calling for an outside leader to come in and take Boeing back to basics. A researcher of a shareholding firm claimed that Boeing's lay in the fact that they had "overpromised" and "underdelivered". The past has shown that Boeing's inability to react to external pressures has increased their demise. The future of the industry will now depend on the ability of either Airbus or Boeing to predict the way the market go. Adapted from: Palmer, I., Dunford, R. & Akin, G. (2016). Managing Organizational Change: A Multiple perspectives Approach. (3rd ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Discussion Questions: With relevant examples, identify and describe the THREE (3) categories of change in the organization 4. 5. Based on question (a) evaluate Boeing's categories of change. Justify your answer with evidences. Additional Discussion Questions 1. Describe the tactics for overcoming resistance to change. Not Secure - ewble-sl.utar.edu.my 8:07 WEEK 7 Tutorial 7: (Topic 6: Managing Change and Innovation) The Boeing Company Market demand increased dramatically and Boeing attempted to meet this surplus of orders by doubling their production capabilities instantaneously. A manufacturing crisis ensued and Boeing's reputation took a dramatic tum for the worse when they were required to halt production of the 747 aircraft for 20 days. The "win at all costs" approach that Boeing supposedly had to its business dealings and a lack of communication within the organization appeared to have been the source of this problem. After experiencing these manufacturing difficulties, an attempt was made to revitalize Boeing's operations by streamlining aircraft assembly and increasing the efficiency of the company. This was to be done by focusing on production and costs, not on "airy vision statements." Their overall strategy was to update their technology systems with new computer systems, changes in machinery, methods, automation, and job design, downsize their operations by modifying the lines of authority, span of control and arrangement of work function, and reestablish relationships with their suppliersthe only feasible way costs could be cut. Perhaps the first step in recognizing that the cycle of demand for their products caused massive fluctuations in revenue each year and the company needed more stability occurred when Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas to increase its defense contracts. This merger, however, brought with it difficulties in the way of cultural synthesis. McDonnell Douglas had a very strong culture that focused on their dealings with government officials for defense contracts. Combined with Boeing's family-orientated culture, the merger was not without integration issues. The decision was made to diversity from the traditional commercial airline industry and the many acquisitions that were made created integration issues for the company. The aim again was to add more stability to the business by diversifying into information services and the space industry - providing service with elevated margins that would reflect on Boeing's bottom line. Condit later admitted that entry into the space industry was an erroneous move. According to the CEO of Airbus, Noel Forgeard, the process of diversification was "extremely demoralising for Boeing employees," but Boeing's vice president of marketing, Randy Baseler, claimed that "what affects morale right now is that we are at a down cycle." Regardless of the reasoning behind it, Boeing's employee morale was at low and this issue needed to be address. According to the BusinessWeek reporter, Boeing was in dire need of "a strong board and a rejuvenated corporate culture based on innovation and competitiveness, not crony capitalism." Boeing's past had left its culture in pieces. Rightly or wrongly, Boeing's old sense of exceptionalism--"We're Boeing and you're not," one old saying went--is giving way to something slightly more common. As CFO Mike Sears puts it, "We need for everybody to understand that we're in business." Boeing's work force, of course, doesn't like the idea much. Employee attrition in Seattle is running at double the normal rate, and the company's own employee surveys show morale sinking: When asked to rate Boeing as a place to work compared with other companies, for instance, only 39% of respondents rated it positively, compared with 61% two years ago. "People aren't seeing the vision the company is talking about," says Charles Bofferding of the engineers union. Instead, they see in Boeing's recent moves--the executive firings, the drive to outsource, the push into services--not the creation of a vibrant new business culture but the dismantling of one of the most successful engineering cultures of all time. "The motivator is fear and intimidation," says one unionist. Harry Stonecipher, the past head of McDonnell Douglas who had come in as the new chief operating officer of Boeing after the company was acquired, was announced as the new CEO after Condit's resignation. His first important decision was regarding the new 7E7 planes, Not Secure – ewble-sl.utar.edu.my C