Let the following simultaneous game matrix be used L1 and L2 are the strategies of the player Line Cl and C2 are the strategies of the player Column We reason here in pure strategies and in mixed strategies С1 C2 L1(2, 1) (0, O) L2 (0, 0) (1, 2) Please select one answer: a. In this game, there is no balance in pure strategies and the balance in mixed strategies is (2/3; 1/3) b. In this game, there is an equilibrium in pure strategies and the equilibrium in mixed strategies is (2/3; 1/3) In this game, there are two pure strategy equilibria and the mixed strategy equilibrium is (2/3; 2/3) d. In this game, there are two pure strategy equilibria and the mixed strategy equilibrium is (2/3; 1/3) е. In this game, there are two equilibria in pure strategies and no equilibrium in mixed strategies

Let the following simultaneous game matrix be used L1 and L2 are the strategies of the player Line Cl and C2 are the strategies of the player Column We reason here in pure strategies and in mixed strategies С1 C2 L1(2, 1) (0, O) L2 (0, 0) (1, 2) Please select one answer: a. In this game, there is no balance in pure strategies and the balance in mixed strategies is (2/3; 1/3) b. In this game, there is an equilibrium in pure strategies and the equilibrium in mixed strategies is (2/3; 1/3) In this game, there are two pure strategy equilibria and the mixed strategy equilibrium is (2/3; 2/3) d. In this game, there are two pure strategy equilibria and the mixed strategy equilibrium is (2/3; 1/3) е. In this game, there are two equilibria in pure strategies and no equilibrium in mixed strategies

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Q2
4. Consider a normal form game with N= {1,2} and S= {A,B,C,D} x {W,X,Y,Z}. Assume that L1 allows to eliminate D and X, L2 allows to eliminate B and C, and L3 allows to eliminate Z. Provide payoffs that lead to this outcome. State the rationality assumptions explicitly.
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y A 10, 5 6, 3 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 1, 3 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 One of these players has a strictly dominant strategy. Which player, and what strategy is it? Player 2; Y Player 1; A Player 2; X O Player 1; B O Player 1; X
For each of the following games, identify the backwards induction equilibrium and the equilibrium strategy for each player. 5. b. (1,1) (0,2) (2.2) (0,1) (1,) (1.0)
3
fast i will 10 upvotes
Player 2 A B C А 2, 2 6,1 1,1 Player 1 B 1,6 5,5 1,1 1,1 1,1 4,4 Consider the simultaneous move game represented in normal form by this payoff matrix. Suppose that the game is repeated for two periods. Which of the following outcomes could occur in some subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this repeated game? Choose True if you think the outcome can be a SPE, otherwise choose False. (B, B) is played in the first period, (C, C) is played in the second period. (A, A) is played in both periods. (C, C) is played in both periods.
3
The hand written is not allowed.
5. Consider a game with the following payoff table for player 1: Strategy Player 1 1 11 2 3 1 3 -4 1 Player 2 2 -3 -2 3 3 -2 −1 2 (a) Use Excel Solver to find the optimal mixed strategy for each player.