(a) Find all (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria in the following two-player game: L C R U 2,4 -2, 2 -2,0 D-2,0 -1,6 0,8 (b) Find all (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria in the following three-player game: player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, player 3 chooses the matrix. X Y Y X 3,-2, 4 0,-3,2 Y 0,-3,2 0,-3,2 х 0, -3,2 | 0,-3, 2 Y 0,-3,2 12, 1, 10 Y

(a) Find all (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria in the following two-player game: L C R U 2,4 -2, 2 -2,0 D-2,0 -1,6 0,8 (b) Find all (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria in the following three-player game: player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, player 3 chooses the matrix. X Y Y X 3,-2, 4 0,-3,2 Y 0,-3,2 0,-3,2 х 0, -3,2 | 0,-3, 2 Y 0,-3,2 12, 1, 10 Y

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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