Let G be the following static zero sum game. Rose Colin A B C D A 5 -7 B-4 -3 -2 1 C-1 7 3 2 D 5-2 6-3 4 -2 (a) Draw the movement diagram of G. (b) Using the method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, find the smallest subgame of G from which the solution of G can be realized. (You do not have to find the solution of the game.)

Let G be the following static zero sum game. Rose Colin A B C D A 5 -7 B-4 -3 -2 1 C-1 7 3 2 D 5-2 6-3 4 -2 (a) Draw the movement diagram of G. (b) Using the method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, find the smallest subgame of G from which the solution of G can be realized. (You do not have to find the solution of the game.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy C D E F Player 1 A 9, 8 14, 14 18, 25 12, 19 B 23, 13 10, 18 14, 26 19, 21 a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy? multiple choice Strategy B Strategy A Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff. Prev
3.Students A and B decide whether to clean the dormitory. Regardless of whether the other party participates, the cleaning cost for each student to clean the dormitory is $ 8; and the benefit for each student from cleaning is $5 times the number of participants. (hint: if both of them clean the dormitory together, A and B benefit. If one cleans while the other does not, A and B benefit too) (a) Please use a game theory to briefly describe the above scenario, (that is to calculate the revenue for different strategies) (b) Draw the payoff matrix, find the Nash equilibrium.
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y A 10, 5 6, 3 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 1, 3 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 One of these players has a strictly dominant strategy. Which player, and what strategy is it? Player 2; Y Player 1; A Player 2; X O Player 1; B O Player 1; X
Consider the following game tree. The players are P1 and P2. The strategies available to P1 are L, M, R. The strategies available to P2 are A and B. P1 L R M P2 (1,10) A В A B (0,0) (2,1) (0,0) (2,1)
on Mary, UE, BD UF, AC DF, BC UF, BD DE, AC DE, BC Nancy U D Nancy -5,4 Mary -0,2 -6,2 -2.6 Which of the following answers is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game? Check all that apply. (Answers below are formatted as Mary's strategy, Nancy's strategy.)
3
Question 8: Consider the strategic game above. Which of the following is true? a. for Player 1, x1 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy b. for Player 1,x2 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy c. for Player 1, x3 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy d. for Player 1, no action is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy
None
(c) Consider the following two-player, zero-sum game: Y1 Y2 X1 -2 8 X2 10 -5 What is the outcome of this game?
The hand written is not allowed.