It may seem as though basic static games are too simple to describe the strategic choices faced by modern transnational firms. Yet simple normal-form games apply to the case studies presented in both of the textbooks. Present your observation of what many of these cases have in common. This is your rule category. Point out the cases that are exceptions, if any, and why you think they are different from the others. This is your exception category. In response to your classmates' posts, explain what circumstances would have to change to move a case from the rule category to the exception category, or

It may seem as though basic static games are too simple to describe the strategic choices faced by modern transnational firms. Yet simple normal-form games apply to the case studies presented in both of the textbooks. Present your observation of what many of these cases have in common. This is your rule category. Point out the cases that are exceptions, if any, and why you think they are different from the others. This is your exception category. In response to your classmates' posts, explain what circumstances would have to change to move a case from the rule category to the exception category, or

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.8P

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