It has been estimated that the herd immunity threshold for the H1N1 flu of 2009 was 25%but that for the H1N1 flu of 1918 it was 74%. In most years, the herd immunity thresholdfor the flu is around 50%. The herd immunity threshold is a function of thecontagiousness of the flu strain and the effectiveness of the flu shot. There was no flushot in 1918, the herd immunity in 1918 came from people having had the flu andsubsequently having immunity. c. What subsidy per vaccine would be necessary in order for Q* percent of thepopulation to choose to be fully vaccinated? (Assume that individuals willrespond to monetary incentives - as we discussed in class, vaccines may be a casewhere people will not respond to monetary incentives.) Explain in words andgraphically.

The Demand CurveThe demand curve represents the quantity of vaccines that individuals are willing to…

Answered: It has been estimated that the herd…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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The government would like to introduce a subsidy to help citizens who need their car for work and cannot afford to buy a ULEZ-compliant car. It also wants to ensure that only citizens who need to drive their car regularly use the subsidy. Instead of the two groups of citizens discussed above, we focus on one particular citizen who does not drive very often, only once a year. As a result, this citizen does not emit excessive pollution even with a car that is not ULEZ-compliant. The government would therefore prefer citizens like her not to buy a new car to avoid having to pay the subsidy unnecessarily. Once a year, the citizen derives a benefit of driving through the ULEZ area of B = 20. She can choose to either buy a new ULEZ-compliant car at a cost of C = 10, 000, denoted x = new, or stick with her old car at no cost, denoted x = old. 5 If she sticks with her old car, she has to pay a ULEZ fee of τ = 12.50 on the day that she drives. Her net benefit of driving on that day is…
Suppose that every driver faces a 3% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $6,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $30,000.00 in the bank and those with $1,200.00 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $1,200.00 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. Assume that both types of individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full insurance, in which all damages are paid by the insurance company, is . Assume that the price of insurance is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $1,200.00 in the bank likely buy insurance, and those with $30,000.00 in the bank likely buy insurance. (Hint: For each type of driver, compare the price of insurance to the expected cost without insurance.) Suppose a state law has been passed…
The mayor of Green City is considering whether to institute a Covid vaccine mandate for public employees. The fire chief opposes vaccination, and has threatened to resign if a mandate is instituted. The mayor believes that instituting a mandate is critical to getting Covid under control, and thus not instituting the mandate would costs the city -50 utility. However, the fire chief is critical to maintaining public safety. If the fire chief resigns, it would cost the city 75 utility. The fire chief believes a mandate would be an invasion of his personal freedom, costing him 20 utility. The mandate only impacts the fire chief if he does not resign. However, resigning his job as fire chief would cost him 40 utility. Draw this game. Identify how many subgames it contains. Then, solve the game to find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Suppose that every driver faces a 3% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $9,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $72,000.00 in the bank and those with $2,250.00 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $2,250.00 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. Assume that both types of individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full insurance, in which all damages are paid by the insurance company, is $_____________ . Assume that the price of insurance is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $72,000.00 in the bank likely ________ (will not or will) buy insurance, and those with $2,250.00 in the bank likely ______ (WILL OR WILL NOT) buy insurance. (Hint: For each type of driver, compare the price of insurance to the expected…
A reserve price is a minimum price set by the auctioneer. If no bidder is willing to pay the reserve price, the item is unsold at a profit of $0 for the auctioneer. If only one bidder values the item at or above the reserve price, that bidder pays the reserve price. An auctioneer faces two bidders, each with a value of either $60 or $160, with both values equally probable. Without a reserve price, the second highest bid will be the price paid by the winning bidder. The following table lists the four possible combinations of bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur. On the following table, indicate the price paid by the winning bidder with and without the stated reserve price. Bidder 1 Value Bidder 2 Value Price Without Reserve ($) ($) ($) $60 $60 $60 $160 $160 $60 $160 $160 Probability 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Without a reserve price, the expected price is $ expected price is larger_ the reserve price. Price with $160 Reserve Price With a reserve price of $160, the…
Question 2 A new digital file of lectures on the topic of intermediate microeconomics is being marketed on the Internet as a resource to prepare for the final exam. As an experiment, the marketing firm wants to direct half of Web hits to a page that advertises the lectures as a resource that provide a 90% probability of successfully passing the final exam, while the other half are directed to a page that advertises the lectures as a resource that provide a 10% probability of failing to pass the final exam. Would you expect equal numbers of sales from the two advertising approaches? Explain and use the appropriate concepts to answer the question, demonstrating your critical understanding of the relevant course material.
The market for lemons refers to a situation where sellers are better informed than buyers about the quality of the good for sale, like used cars. While sellers know the true quality of the car, buyers can’t distinguish the good cars from the bad cars (a.k.a. lemons). Consequently, from the buyer's perspective, there is a 50-50 chance that cars are either high or low quality, and therefore they will perceive all cars as medium quality cars. Which of the following statements are true? Multiple Choice From the seller's point of view, the price that buyers are willing to pay is too low. Therefore, they will find it difficult to sell their cars at "true" value. For the sellers who are selling lemons, the offered price will be higher than what they have expected. Therefore, they will sell lemons to the buyers at a higher price. Because buyers perceive all cars as medium quality cars they will pay a price that is between the price of good cars and the price of lemons.…
When a famous painting becomes available for sale, it is often known which museum or collector will be the likely winner. Yet, the auctioneer actively woos representatives of other museums that have no chance of winning to attend anyway. Suppose a piece of art has recently become available for sale and will be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the winner paying an amount equal to the second highest bid. Assume that most collectors know that Yakov places a value of $35,000 on the art piece and that he values this art piece more than any other collector. Suppose that if no one else shows up, Yakov simply bids $35,0002=$17,500 $35,000 2 = $17,500 and wins the piece of art. The expected price paid by Yakov, with no other bidders present, is. Suppose the owner of the artwork manages to recruit another bidder, Bob, to the auction. Bob is known to value the art piece at $28,000. The expected price paid by Yakov, given the presence of the second bidder Bob, is.
Suppose that there is asymmetric information in the market for used cars. Sellers know the quality of the car that they are selling, but buyers do not. Buyers know that there is a 30% chance of getting a "lemon", a low quality used car. A high quality used car is worth $30,000, and a low quality used car is worth $15.000. Based on this probability, the most that a buyer would be willing to pay for a used car is S. (Enter your response rounded to the nearest dollar.)
How are the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) are affected and responded to the COVID 19 pandemic?
The government would like to introduce a subsidy to help citizens who need their car for work and cannot afford to buy a ULEZ-compliant car. It also wants to ensure that only citizens who need to drive their car regularly use the subsidy. Instead of the two groups of citizens discussed above, we focus on one particular citizen who does not drive very often, only once a year. As a result, this citizen does not emit excessive pollution even with a car that is not ULEZ-compliant. The government would therefore prefer citizens like her not to buy a new car to avoid having to pay the subsidy unnecessarily. Once a year, the citizen derives a benefit of driving through the ULEZ area of B = 20. She can choose to either buy a new ULEZ-compliant car at a cost of C = 10, 000, denoted x = new, or stick with her old car at no cost, denoted x = old.If she sticks with her old car, she has to pay a ULEZ fee of τ = 12.50 on the day that she drives. Her net benefit of driving on that day is therefore…
Fred wants to hire Barney to manage his retail store. Barney can apply a high level of effort (at a cost to him of $30), a medium level of effort (at a cost to him of $10), or a low level of effort (at a cost to him of $0). Fred's profits depend not only of the level of Barney's effort but also on the state of consumer demand. Fred believes that demand will be high with probability 50 percent (and therefore demand will be low with probability 50 percent). Fred has determined the following possible profit levels (before paying Barney) will occur depending on Barney's effort and the state of consumer demand: Demand low high effort low 20 40 medium 40 80 high 80 100 Of the choices below, what is the largest percentage range of profit provided to Barney that would ensure Barney would supply high effort? a. any percent greater than 75.00 percent (3/4). b. any percent greater than 66.66 percent (2/3). c. any percent greater than 50.00 percent (1/2).d. any…

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