In an industry with inverse demand curve p= 340 - 2Q, there are five firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost given by MC = 20. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce? Each firm will produce q = units. (Enter your response as a whole number.)

In an industry with inverse demand curve p= 340 - 2Q, there are five firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost given by MC = 20. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce? Each firm will produce q = units. (Enter your response as a whole number.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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please explain in steps