In an auction, potential buyers compete for a good by submitting bids. Adam Gallinsky, a social scientist from NWU, compared eBay auctions in which the same good was sold. He found on average that, the higher the number of bidders the higher the sales price. For example, in two separate auctions of identical IPods, the one with the higher number of bidders brought the higher sales price. According to Gallinsky, this explains why smart sellers set absurdly low opening prices (the lowest price the seller will accept), such as 1 cent for a new IPod. Use the concept of consumer and producer surplus to explain this reasoning.

In an auction, potential buyers compete for a good by submitting bids. Adam Gallinsky, a social scientist from NWU, compared eBay auctions in which the same good was sold. He found on average that, the higher the number of bidders the higher the sales price. For example, in two separate auctions of identical IPods, the one with the higher number of bidders brought the higher sales price. According to Gallinsky, this explains why smart sellers set absurdly low opening prices (the lowest price the seller will accept), such as 1 cent for a new IPod. Use the concept of consumer and producer surplus to explain this reasoning.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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