Identify all the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy of the fol-lowing game tree:P1XLP2ABP1RP2DP2255041HP1322Figure 1: Extensive form game1×7P121

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: P1's Strategy: Choose L at the first node.P2's Strategy after L:…

Answered: Identify all the Subgame Perfect Nash…

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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Find all the Nash equilibria (in the strategic form) and the subgame perfect nash equilibria in the following game. Are they the same ?
Question 7 Consider the following extensive form game. The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the game is X P2 Y P₂ D' C' N c' D' (2) () () (1) (1) (2) (2,4)
am. 116.
Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies Exercise 4.2 Consider the following normal form of a game. Use IEDS to reduce this game and find any Nash Equilibrium. X Y Z (60,50) (50,110) (70,90) (100,60) (70,70) (110,100) (110,70) (100,110) (40,40)
6) The following is a static game D 2,2 0,3 D 3,0 1,1 a) Convert this game into dynamic form game b) Find the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. c) If you consider this game as dynamic then what kind of dynamic game is this.
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Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m) Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change 30, 40 25, 35 15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores 35, 30 28, 32 18, 33 Large Expansion 12, 22 18, 20 20, 25 The Nash equilibrium: (A) does not exist. (B) occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores. (C) occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D) occurs when both firms choose No Change.
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Identify all the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy of the fol- lowing game tree: P1 X L P2 A B P1 R P2 D P2 25 5 0 4 1 H P 1 3 2 2 Figure 1: Extensive form game 1 × 7 P1 21