Gary's Gas and Frank's Fuel are the only two providers of gasoline in their town. Below is the demand schedule for the market of gasoline. Assume that the cost of producing gasoline is zero per gallon (AC-0, FC-0). Suppose that the two producers collude (split production and profits evenly), what are the profits of each firm? Q demanded (in gallons) 4 6 7 10 Market price (in dollar) $22 $20 $18 $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $0 O $70 O $72 O $36 O $76 $64 91 8 3. 2. 1,
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- 2) Assume that there are 2 firms producing an identical product. Both firms have the same total cost function TC(q) =q2. The inverse demand function for the firms' output is p=120 Q, where Q is the total output and p is price. 1. What are the equilibrium price, output and profits of each firm if they are competing with each other? (Hint: Consider the equilibrium in a Cournot game.) 2. What happens if they form a cartel? Calculate the equilibrium price, output, and profits for the cartel? 3. If a single firm cheated, what would its output and profits be, assuming the other firm maintains the cartel price? Calculate the new outputs and profits for bath firms: 4. Discuss why it is hard to enforce a cartel. Explain using words. DO NOT do any calculations. DO NOT draw any graphs. 5. What can the cartel members do to enforce the cartel agreement? Propose a method. Describe the method using words. DO NOT do any calculations. DO NOT draw any graphs.1. The cost function for any potential firm in a manufacturing industry is C(y) = 2 + 8y + 2y? (if a firm exits the industry, then its cost is zero). The inverse market demand function is given by P(y) = 100 – 2y. (a) If there is only one firm in the industry (the firm is a monopolist), what is the optimal output and the markup of the firm in equilibrium?Two firms are engaged in Bertrand competition. There are 10,000 people in the population, each of whom is willing to pay at most 10 for at most one unit of the good. Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 5. Each firm is allocated half the market. It costs a customer s to switch from one firm to the other. Customers know what prices are being charged. Law or custom restricts the firms to charging whole-dollar amounts (e.g., they can charge 6, but not 6.50). a. Suppose that s = 0. What are the Nash equilibria of this model? Why does discrete (whole-dollar) pricing result in more equilibria than continuous pricing? b. Suppose that s = 2. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of this model? c. Suppose that s = 4. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of this model? d. Comparing the expected profits in (b) to those in (c), what is the value of raising customers’ switching costs from 2 to 4?.
- Question 3 The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has al cost of production of C₁= 15*Q₁ and firm 2 has a cost of production of C₂=20*Q₂. 1) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compute simultaneously in quantities. What are the Cournot quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 2) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compete simultaneously in prices. What are the Bertrand quantities and prices? What are the profits of firm 1 and 2? 3) Suppose that firm play a Stackelberg game. First firm 1 sets the quantity in t=1, then, knowing which quantity firm 1 has set, firm 2 chooses the quantity in t=2. What are the Stackelberg quantities and prices? What are the profits od firm 1 and 2? Compared to part a) which firm benefits and which firm loses?2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 0.5q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5 - p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 0.5 (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…250 225 Revenue Lost 200 175 150 Revenue Gained 125 Demand 100 75 50 25 3 4 7 8 9. 10 QUANTITY (Fire engines) Gilberto increase production from 7 to 8 fire engines because the dominates in this scenario. True or False: If Gilberto's Fire Engines were a competitive firm instead and $100,000 were the market price for an engine, decreasing its price from $100,000 to $50,000 would result in the same change in the production quantity and, thus, total revenue. O True O False acer Σ 2. 1. PRICE (Thousands of dollars per fire engine)
- 21. In the industry, only two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) operate and they produce a homogenous good. They collude: they maximize their joint profit and split it equally between them. Firm I has the total cost of producing q; units of output given by the function TC(q)-8q1. The total cost of producing q: units of output for Firm 2 is TC(q)-q. Only integer quantities are allowed (no fractions). The market demand for the good is Q(P)-72-P, where Q is the quantity demanded and P is the unit price of the good. How many units of the good do cach firm produce in the equilibrium? A. Each firm produces 14 units. B. Firm I produces 32 units, and Firm 2 produces 2 units. C. Firm 1 produces 28 units, and Firm 2 produces 4 units. D. Each firm produces 16 units. E. None of the aboveThe information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $200,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. 1. Assume there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell, how many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be sold altogether and what price will be charged when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? 2. Under the conditions given in Question #3 of this problem, how much profit will each firm earn when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? 3. What is the socially efficient level of digital premium channel subscriptions for this market and at what…Two firms Intel and AMD in the CPU market have combined demand given by Q = 100 - P. Their total costs are given by TC Intel = 4 Q Intel + 2 Q Intel^2 and TC AMD = 4 Q AMD + 2 Q AMD^2. If they successfully collude, the market price will be??
- Suppose the inverse market demand for manufactures is P(Q) = A – Q, where P and Q denoteprice and total goods produced and the parameter A denotes the size of the domestic market.Suppose any firm has a cost function, c(q) = cq, where A > c. Suppose there are two firm in themarket which produce q1 and q2, where Q = q1 + q2.a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium levels of output (Q*), price (P*) and markups.b. What is the impact of an increase in market size, A, on Q*, P* and markups when there are twofirms? Provide some intuition for these predictions.c. Suppose a third firm enters so that Q = q1 + q2 + q3. What is the impact of entry on Q*, P* andmarkups? And why? Explanation and math work for all three parts please!!3) Suppose the duopolists producing homogeneous products face the following market demand curve P=80-Q where Q=Q₁ +Q₂ TC₁ = 60, and TC₂ = 80₁ i) Suppose the duopolists compete by simultaneously choosing output, what price will each firm choose? How much will each firm produce? And how much profit will each firm make? ii) Suppose the firms now move sequentially with firm 1 moving first, what price will each firm choose? How much will each firm produce? And how much profit will each firm make?2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…