Firm 1 and Firm 2 are Stackelberg competitors. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower. They have the same cost functions Cost, = 30Q1 Cost2 = 30Q2 The market demand is 2P QD = 780- 3 In the SPE of this game, Firm 1 produces Q1= . Firm 2 produces Q2=| +, and the price is P=

Firm 1 and Firm 2 are Stackelberg competitors. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower. They have the same cost functions Cost, = 30Q1 Cost2 = 30Q2 The market demand is 2P QD = 780- 3 In the SPE of this game, Firm 1 produces Q1= . Firm 2 produces Q2=| +, and the price is P=

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

Firm 1 and Firm 2 are Stackelberg competitors. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower.
They have the same cost functions
Cost = 30Q1
Cost2 = 30Q2
The market demand is
2P
OP = 780 –
3
In the SPE of this game, Firm 1 produces Q1=|
+, Firm 2 produces Q2=|
+, and the price is P=

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