Suppose two firms A and B compete against each other in a Cournot fashion by choosing their quantities. What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game if both firms have a constant marginal cost of 2 and the price in the market is: p(qa + qB) = 20 –2(q4 + qB). O (3, 3) O (2, 2) O (4, 4) O None of the other answers are correct O (5, 5)

Suppose two firms A and B compete against each other in a Cournot fashion by choosing their quantities. What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game if both firms have a constant marginal cost of 2 and the price in the market is: p(qa + qB) = 20 –2(q4 + qB). O (3, 3) O (2, 2) O (4, 4) O None of the other answers are correct O (5, 5)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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