Copy at least 2 quotations from the foundational document. a. Under each quotation write a 1 SENTENCE SUMMARY or PARAPHRASE the main ideas Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary DepartmentBy Alexander Hamilton, To the People of the State of New York:WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of theproposed government.In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity ofa federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary torecapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution inthe abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised beingrelative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points,therefore, our observations shall be confined.According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by theUnited States are to hold their offices DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR. ... The standardof good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, iscertainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice ofgovernment. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of theprince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments andoppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can bedevised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartialadministration of the laws.The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of thecommunity. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes therules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. Thejudiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; nodirection either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take noactive resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL,but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executivearm even for the efficacy of its judgments. This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. Itproves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of thethree departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of theother two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itselfagainst their attacks.and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independenceas permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as anindispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as thecitadel of the public justice and the public security.The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in alimited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which containscertain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as thatit shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like.Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than throughthe medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contraryto the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservationsof particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be anintermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among otherthings, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. Theinterpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. Aconstitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning ofany particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen tobe an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superiorobligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, theConstitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people tothe intention of their agents.

The above extracts are from the essay written by Alexander Hamilton. It was titled Federalist No.78.…

Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary Department By Alexander Hamilton, To the People of the State of New York: WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined. According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR. ... The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.