er's ownership land rental ecropping r E's production function is y = 20 x VT (Yis the final output, Lis labor input) ng to theory, E's effort will be the lowest under which ownership? ( you should be able to answer this question without calc ng to theory, E will be facing the lowest level of risk under which land ownership? ng E is working under a fixed land rental contract, with a yearly rent of 50. His twin brother F, who has exactly the same pro , is working with a different landlord who charges 20% of the yearly revenue. Why? calculation) What is farmer E's profit function? calculation) What is his brother F's objective function? How is the optimal effort defined? ( only explain the concept) calculation) How much labor would E invest in his land ( He knows exactly how his profit function looks like ) ? nuch profit could he make under optimal effort? Assume his twin brother F doesn't know how to optimize his resource like E, instead, F decides to just copy E's behavior (I mount of effort into his land as E). Will this decision bring F the same level of profit as E? calculation) E decides to help his brother out by suggesting a proper effort level based on F's sharecropping contract, what suggested labor input be?
er's ownership land rental ecropping r E's production function is y = 20 x VT (Yis the final output, Lis labor input) ng to theory, E's effort will be the lowest under which ownership? ( you should be able to answer this question without calc ng to theory, E will be facing the lowest level of risk under which land ownership? ng E is working under a fixed land rental contract, with a yearly rent of 50. His twin brother F, who has exactly the same pro , is working with a different landlord who charges 20% of the yearly revenue. Why? calculation) What is farmer E's profit function? calculation) What is his brother F's objective function? How is the optimal effort defined? ( only explain the concept) calculation) How much labor would E invest in his land ( He knows exactly how his profit function looks like ) ? nuch profit could he make under optimal effort? Assume his twin brother F doesn't know how to optimize his resource like E, instead, F decides to just copy E's behavior (I mount of effort into his land as E). Will this decision bring F the same level of profit as E? calculation) E decides to help his brother out by suggesting a proper effort level based on F's sharecropping contract, what suggested labor input be?
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Transcribed Image Text:Effort
Investment
Risk
Farmer's ownership
Fixed land rental
Sharecropping
Farmer E's production function is
20 x VI
(Y is the final output, Lis labor input)
Y =
According to theory, E's effort will be the lowest under which ownership? ( you should be able to answer this question without calculation )
According to theory, E will be facing the lowest level of risk under which land ownership?
Why?
Assuming E is working under a fixed land rental contract, with a yearly rent of 50. His twin brother F, who has exactly the same production
function, is working with a different landlord who charges 20% of the yearly revenue.
• (calculation) What is farmer E's profit function?
• (calculation) What is his brother F's objective function?
• How is the optimal effort defined? (only explain the concept)
• (calculation) How much labor would E invest in his land (He knows exactly how his profit function looks like ) ?
How
much profit could he make under optimal effort?
Assume his twin brother F doesn't know how to optimize his resource like E, instead, F decides to just copy E's behavior ( F put in the same
amount of effort into his land as E). Will this decision bring F the same level of profit as E?
(calculation) E decides to help his brother out by suggesting a proper effort level based on F's sharecropping contract, what would the
suggested labor input be?
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