ECON 446 - PROBLEM SET VI 1. Consider a marriage problem (M, W, R), where M = {a,b,c,d}, W = {E, F, G, H}, and preferences R = (Ra, Rb, Re, Rd, RE, RF, RG, RH) are as follows: . . . . Ra F Pa H Pa G Pa E Paa, : Re: HPF PC PG PE, RE: d PE b PE a PEC PE E, RG b PG a PG d PG c PG G, : Rb F PG PH P₁b P₁ E, Rd E Pa F Pa G Pad Pa H, RF d PF a PF b PF F PF C, : RH a PH b PH CPH d PH H. (i) Find the matching μW (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's women proposing DA algo- rithm and show that it is stable. (ii) Find the matching μM (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's men proposing DA algo- rithm and show that it is stable. μ (iii) Consider matching = {(a, H), (b, E), (c, G), (d, F)}. Is individually rational? Is μ stable? Is μ Pareto optimal? (iii) Consider matching ' = {(a, G), (b, F), (c, H), (d, E)}. Is ' individually rational? Is μ' stable? Is Pareto optimal?

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ECON 446 - PROBLEM SET VI
1. Consider a marriage problem (M, W, R), where M = {a,b,c,d}, W = {E, F, G, H}, and
preferences R = (Ra, Rb, Re, Rd, RE, RF, RG, RH) are as follows:
.
.
.
.
Ra F Pa H Pa G Pa E Paa,
:
Re: HPF PC PG PE,
RE: d PE b PE a PEC PE E,
RG b PG a PG d PG c PG G,
:
Rb F PG PH P₁b P₁ E,
Rd E Pa F Pa G Pad Pa H,
RF d PF a PF b PF F PF C,
:
RH a PH b PH CPH d PH H.
(i) Find the matching μW (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's women proposing DA algo-
rithm and show that it is stable.
(ii) Find the matching μM (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's men proposing DA algo-
rithm and show that it is stable.
μ
(iii) Consider matching = {(a, H), (b, E), (c, G), (d, F)}. Is individually rational? Is μ
stable? Is μ Pareto optimal?
(iii) Consider matching ' = {(a, G), (b, F), (c, H), (d, E)}. Is ' individually rational? Is μ'
stable? Is Pareto optimal?
Transcribed Image Text:ECON 446 - PROBLEM SET VI 1. Consider a marriage problem (M, W, R), where M = {a,b,c,d}, W = {E, F, G, H}, and preferences R = (Ra, Rb, Re, Rd, RE, RF, RG, RH) are as follows: . . . . Ra F Pa H Pa G Pa E Paa, : Re: HPF PC PG PE, RE: d PE b PE a PEC PE E, RG b PG a PG d PG c PG G, : Rb F PG PH P₁b P₁ E, Rd E Pa F Pa G Pad Pa H, RF d PF a PF b PF F PF C, : RH a PH b PH CPH d PH H. (i) Find the matching μW (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's women proposing DA algo- rithm and show that it is stable. (ii) Find the matching μM (R) that is the result of the Gale-Shapley's men proposing DA algo- rithm and show that it is stable. μ (iii) Consider matching = {(a, H), (b, E), (c, G), (d, F)}. Is individually rational? Is μ stable? Is μ Pareto optimal? (iii) Consider matching ' = {(a, G), (b, F), (c, H), (d, E)}. Is ' individually rational? Is μ' stable? Is Pareto optimal?
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