Consider two firms producing homogeneous goods. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously set outputs q and q2. The inverse demand isP=20-3(q₁+9₂) and both firms have marginal costs of 2. In a Nash equilibrium, the firms producea. (qq) = (2,2)b. (992) = (1.5,3)Ⓒc. Each of the other suggestions might occur in a Nash equilibriumd. (9₁.92 )=(3,1.5)

Given Inverse demand function: P=20-3(q1+q2) ..... (1) The marginal cost function of…

Consider two firms producing homogeneous goods. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously set outputs q, and q₂. The inverse demand is P=20-3(9₁ +9₂) and both firms have marginal costs of 2. In a Nash equilibrium, the firms produce a. (992)=(2,2) b. (qq) = (1.5,3) c. Each of the other suggestions might occur in a Nash equilibrium d. (9₁-92)=(3,1.5)

Consider two firms producing homogeneous goods. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously set outputs q, and q₂. The inverse demand is P=20-3(9₁ +9₂) and both firms have marginal costs of 2. In a Nash equilibrium, the firms produce a. (992)=(2,2) b. (qq) = (1.5,3) c. Each of the other suggestions might occur in a Nash equilibrium d. (9₁-92)=(3,1.5)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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