Consider the same Stackelberg game with three firms as described by the previous question.Firm 1 chooses the quantity of its production first, then firms 2 and 3 choose their quantitiessimultaneously after observing firm 1's quantities. Suppose that they produce the sameproduct with different cost functions. Firm 1's total cost is C (41) = 10q + 10. firm 2'stotal cost is C2 (92) = 892 , and firm 3's total cost is C3 (93) = q³. The firms produceidentical goods and the market price is P (g1: 2, 43) = 300 – 91 – 2 – 93-In the subgame-perfect equilibrium,firm 1 chooses q1firm 2 chooses q2firm 3 chooses q3 =(Please round your answer to 3 decimal places if your answer contains a fraction. E.g., write0.333 if your answer is a 1/3 and write 1 if your answer is 1.)

In a Stackelberg competition with n number of firms, one firm acts as the leader with the remainder…

Consider the same Stackelberg game with three firms as described by the previous question. Firm 1 chooses the quantity of its production first, then firms 2 and 3 choose their quantities simultaneously after observing firm 1's quantities. Suppose that they produce the same product with different cost functions. Firm 1's total cost is C (q) = 1041 + 10 . firm 2's total cost is C2 (q2) = 892 , and firm 3's total cost is C3 (qs) = q}. The firms produce identical goods and the market price is P (91, 92 , 9s) = 300 – 1 – 2 – 93- In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, firm 1 chooses q firm 2 chooses q2 firm 3 chooses q3 = (Please round your answer to 3 decimal places if your answer contains a fraction. E.g., write 0.333 if your answer is a 1/3 and write 1 if your answer is 1.)

Consider the same Stackelberg game with three firms as described by the previous question. Firm 1 chooses the quantity of its production first, then firms 2 and 3 choose their quantities simultaneously after observing firm 1's quantities. Suppose that they produce the same product with different cost functions. Firm 1's total cost is C (q) = 1041 + 10 . firm 2's total cost is C2 (q2) = 892 , and firm 3's total cost is C3 (qs) = q}. The firms produce identical goods and the market price is P (91, 92 , 9s) = 300 – 1 – 2 – 93- In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, firm 1 chooses q firm 2 chooses q2 firm 3 chooses q3 = (Please round your answer to 3 decimal places if your answer contains a fraction. E.g., write 0.333 if your answer is a 1/3 and write 1 if your answer is 1.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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