Consider the market for used cars. Suppose that there are "good" used cars and "lemons" (or cars that are likely to fall apart quickly). Suppose that owners of "good" used cars would be willing to sell for $10,000 and owners of "lemons" will sell their car for $2,000. Furthermore, assume buyers are willing to pay $12,000 fo "good" car and $3,000 for a lemon. Assume that sellers know if their car is good or a lemon, but buyers cannot differentiate between good cars and lemons. This situation is an example of O bulk markups that occur with adverse selection O an adverse selection death spiral O ex-post moral hazard O ex-ante moral hazard
Consider the market for used cars. Suppose that there are "good" used cars and "lemons" (or cars that are likely to fall apart quickly). Suppose that owners of "good" used cars would be willing to sell for $10,000 and owners of "lemons" will sell their car for $2,000. Furthermore, assume buyers are willing to pay $12,000 fo "good" car and $3,000 for a lemon. Assume that sellers know if their car is good or a lemon, but buyers cannot differentiate between good cars and lemons. This situation is an example of O bulk markups that occur with adverse selection O an adverse selection death spiral O ex-post moral hazard O ex-ante moral hazard
Chapter4: Utility Maximization And Choice
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 4.2P
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![Question 4
1 pts
Consider the market for used cars. Suppose that there are "good" used cars and "lemons" (or cars
that are likely to fall apart quickly).
Suppose that owners of "good" used cars would be willing to sell for $10,000 and owners of
"lemons" will sell their car for $2,00O. Furthermore, assume buyers are willing to pay $12,000 for a
"good" car and $3,000 for a lemon. Assume that sellers know if their car is good or a lemon, but
buyers cannot differentiate between good cars and lemons.
This situation is an example of
bulk markups that occur with adverse selection
an adverse selection death spiral
ex-post moral hazard
ex-ante moral hazard](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fd3a69a45-2f0b-4808-a6f6-9f2f234df3eb%2Fc3705277-a3b4-45c0-8e00-5e1173a1db64%2F7y2pen_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Question 4
1 pts
Consider the market for used cars. Suppose that there are "good" used cars and "lemons" (or cars
that are likely to fall apart quickly).
Suppose that owners of "good" used cars would be willing to sell for $10,000 and owners of
"lemons" will sell their car for $2,00O. Furthermore, assume buyers are willing to pay $12,000 for a
"good" car and $3,000 for a lemon. Assume that sellers know if their car is good or a lemon, but
buyers cannot differentiate between good cars and lemons.
This situation is an example of
bulk markups that occur with adverse selection
an adverse selection death spiral
ex-post moral hazard
ex-ante moral hazard
Expert Solution
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Step 1
Adverse selection occurs when the seller has more information about the good that buyers don’t. The asymmetric information between the two parties leads to a problem of adverse selection.
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