Consider the following sequential-move game:Player 1Player 2Player 3Player 2Player 3RNLAF3EL34LRPlayer 1Player 3REXE5LRLPleaver gLFind the backward-induction equilibrium of this game.going542"544Player 2چلےPlayer 3RO5

Backward induction is a way to analyse the game in tree form from back to front. In these type of…

Consider the following sequential-move game: Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 4 4 4 Player 2 L L Player 3 R 20 L 4 4 4 3 3 4 R 20 Player 1 Player 3 R NO 2 3 5 5 4 L R L Player 3 R Find the backward-induction equilibrium of this game. L 25 5 5 655 Player 2 R Player 3 R 20 0 5 5

Consider the following sequential-move game: Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 4 4 4 Player 2 L L Player 3 R 20 L 4 4 4 3 3 4 R 20 Player 1 Player 3 R NO 2 3 5 5 4 L R L Player 3 R Find the backward-induction equilibrium of this game. L 25 5 5 655 Player 2 R Player 3 R 20 0 5 5

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3. Find the dominant and dominated strategies in the following games (in case players have such strategies) Is there any dominant strategy equilibrium in any of these games? (b) Player 2 V W X Y A 2,5 4,4 5,5 | 0,4 | 1,5 B 5,3 3,3 4,3 | 2,2 | 1,0 Player 1 C 6,0 | 3,0 | 1,1 | 1,1 0,1 D 6,2 3,0 4,2 3,2 | 1,2 E 1,1 5,1 | 4,2 | 1,0 | 0,2
11) In the following game, list any dominant or dominated strategies. Then, solve the game Player 2 Left Center Right Player 1 Up 1,2 4,6 5,5 Down 6,3 2,4 3,1
Consider the game below. How many best responses does Player 1 have to strategy L of Player 2? 1) 0 2)1 3) 2 4)3 Player 1 T M B L 2,0 2, 2 2,3 Player 2 с 2,1 3,2 1, 2 R 3,2 0,1 0,3
A sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is defined as O A) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a static game. O B) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a dynamic game. O C) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in a single subgame of a dynamic game. O D) the game within the game.
7) What is a repeated game? Why are repeated games useful to consider? What is the difference between finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games? Provide an example of a political situation that would be usefully modeled with a repeated game.
6) Consider the following signaling game: 20, 5 0,0 10, -10 -10,0 Left Left Right Right Player 2 Player 2 1-a Up Up Nature Player 1-A Player 1-B Туре А — 50% Туре В — 50% Down Down Player 2 1-B Player 2 Left Right Left Right 10,5 0,0 5, -10 0,0 Let's see if it has a pooling equilibrium. Follow the following steps: a. Specify strategies of a possible pooling equilibrium b. Determine player 2’s on-path beliefs for the belief probabilities a and ß as appropriate. You can infer these beliefs from what we know about beliefs in pooling equilibria, and do not have fully calculate them. c. Check whether either player wants to deviate. Is there a pooling equilibrium? d. Determine the off-path beliefs that make the equilibrium hold.
Q2
Question 29 Firm B Q = 3 Q= 4 Firm A Q = 3 16,16 12,18 Q = 4 18,12 13,13 The Nash equilibrium in this game is Q = 4 for firm A and Q = 3 for firm B. %3D Q = 3 for firm A and Q = 3 for firm B. %3D Q = 3 for firm A and Q = 4 for firm B. %3D Q = 4 for firm A and Q = 4 for firm B.
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Wal-Mart's dominant strategy is to pick a price of $. Target Price = $30 Price = $17 %3D What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? $6,000 $1,500 O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $17 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $30. Price = $30 $6,000 $11,000 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $30. Wal - Mart C. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $30 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $17. $11,000 $4,500 Price = $17 %3D $1,500 $4,500 O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $17. South OE. O E. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game.
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y 6, 3 1, 3 A 10, 5 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 Is the Nash equilibrium of this game for Player 1 to choose A and Player 2 to choose X? Why or why not? O It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is not; Player 2 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B. O It is; if Player 1 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 2 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 5, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 10. It is not; Player 1 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B.
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