Now answer the following questions:Perform iterative elimination of dominated strategies on the game. Draw the new table for each iteration as shown in the lecture video. Write corresponding actions at left and up of the table. Explain why are you removing each row or column. You should reach a 2*2 game. Rewrite the table separately. From the 2*2 game you get in question 1, find a mixed strategy σ1=(p,1−p) for Player 1 that will make Player 2 indifferent about two actions. Find a mixed strategy σ2=(q,1−q) for Player 2 that will make Player 1 indifferent about two actions. If the players are playing the mixed strategies σ1 and σ2, they both will indifferent about their strategies, hence the strategy profile (σ1,σ2) will be a Nash Equilibrium of this game. Find the expected utility for both Player 1 u1(σ1,σ2) and Player 2 u2(σ1,σ2) at this Nash Equilibrium. Consider the following representation of a Normal form game.actionsa(27,29)(49,18)(43,43)(57,51)(67,62)(41,44)(32,16)(68,49)(83,62)(34,32)(36,5)(49,90)d(14,39)(39,31)(23,22)(59,38)Here each cell in the table represents an ordered pair. First element is payoff of the first player and second element is payoff of the second player. Theletters a, b, c, d, x, y, z, w represent the actions.You have to write down the table in your answer script.

Mixed strategy refers to the a strategy where a player chooses multiple possible actions with…

Answered: Consider the following representation…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Now answer the following questions:

Perform iterative elimination of dominated strategies on the game. Draw the new table for each iteration as shown in the lecture video. Write corresponding actions at left and up of the table. Explain why are you removing each row or column. You should reach a 2*2 game. Rewrite the table separately.
From the 2*2 game you get in question 1, find a mixed strategy σ1=(p,1−p) for Player 1 that will make Player 2 indifferent about two actions.
Find a mixed strategy σ2=(q,1−q) for Player 2 that will make Player 1 indifferent about two actions.
If the players are playing the mixed strategies σ1 and σ2, they both will indifferent about their strategies, hence the strategy profile (σ1,σ2) will be a Nash Equilibrium of this game. Find the expected utility for both Player 1 u1(σ1,σ2) and Player 2 u2(σ1,σ2) at this Nash Equilibrium.

Consider the following representation of a Normal form game.
actions
a
(27,29)
(49,18)
(43,43)
(57,51)
(67,62)
(41,44)
(32,16)
(68,49)
(83,62)
(34,32)
(36,5)
(49,90)
d
(14,39)
(39,31)
(23,22)
(59,38)
Here each cell in the table represents an ordered pair. First element is payoff of the first player and second element is payoff of the second player. The
letters a, b, c, d, x, y, z, w represent the actions.
You have to write down the table in your answer script.

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