Consider the following bargaining game with four rounds: Players 1 and 2 divide a pie of size 1. Both players have a common discount factor, δ = 0.8. In the first round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes x ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts the offer, then player 1 gets x, and player 2 gets 1−x. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 2. In the second round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes y ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts the offer, then player 1 gets δy, and player 2 gets δ − δy. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 3. In the third round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes z ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ2z, and player 2 gets δ2 − δ2z. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 4. In the fourth and final round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes u ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ3u, and player 2 gets δ3 −δ3u. If player 1 rejects the offer, everyone gets 0. 1. What would be the SPNE of the game?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question

Consider the following bargaining game with four rounds: Players 1 and 2 divide a pie of size

1. Both players have a common discount factor, δ = 0.8.

In the first round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes x ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts

the offer, then player 1 gets x, and player 2 gets 1−x. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game

proceeds to round 2.

In the second round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes y ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts

the offer, then player 1 gets δy, and player 2 gets δ − δy. If player 2 rejects the offer, the

game proceeds to round 3.

In the third round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes z ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts

the offer, player 1 gets δ2z, and player 2 gets δ2 − δ2z. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game

proceeds to round 4.

In the fourth and final round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes u ∈ [0, 1]. If player

1 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ3u, and player 2 gets δ3 −δ3u. If player 1 rejects the offer,

everyone gets 0.

1. What would be the SPNE of the game? 

 

Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 3 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Paradox Of Voting
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education