To Vote or Not to Vote Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote. Mrs. Ward vote. don't vote Mr. Ward Vote. -1, -1. 1, -2 don't vote. -2, 1. 0,0?

To Vote or Not to Vote Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote. Mrs. Ward vote. don't vote Mr. Ward Vote. -1, -1. 1, -2 don't vote. -2, 1. 0,0?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.1IP

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Question

To Vote or Not to Vote

Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote.

Mrs. Ward

vote. don't vote

Mr. Ward Vote. -1, -1. 1, -2

don't vote. -2, 1. 0,0?

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