Consider a market with 4 doctors a,b,c,d and 3 hospitals 1,2,3. Eachhospital needs to hire (at most) one doctor. The preference orders ofeach side of the market on the other side are given bya: 1 >2>3>4b: 2>1>3>4c: 2 >3>1>4d: 1 >2 >3 >41: d>b>c>a2: c>a>b>d3: c>b>d>a1) List all of the stable assignments of doctors to hospitals in thismarket.2) Prove that no other stable assignment exists.

Approach to solving the question:We can solve this problem using the Gale-Shapley algorithm, a…

Answered: Consider a market with 4 doctors…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

A narrowly defined market will tend to make concentration appear while a broadly defined market will tend to make it appear O Lower; Higher O Less Concerning; Concerning O Higher; Lower O Concerning; Less Concerning
If James decides to charge the same price for rolls and pies per day (that is, ? = ? ), how many of rolls and pies in total should he make in order to maximize the profit of a particular day? b) If James decides to charge different prices as above for rolls and pies per day(that is, ? ≠ ? ), how many of rolls and pies should he make in order to maximize the profit of a particular day?
In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enforces regulations aimed at ensuring that new drugs that are marketed do, in fact, have the functions they are supposed to have. Which of the following arguments provides an appropriate justification for such regulations? These regulations are necessary because: A. verification by each consumer would be extremely inefficient B. verification is an easy task within a market economy C. quantity regulations are so rare within a market economy D. quantity regulations are so efficient
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
Consider a market with two firms, A and B, producing two varieties of the same product withdifferent qualities. In particular, the variety produced by firm A has quality Va = 2, while thevariety produced by firm B has quality Vb = 10.Firm A costs are TCa(qa) = 1/2*qa, while firm B costs are TCb(qb) = 2*qbConsumers value quality differently, with each individual i valuing quality bi , a numberbetween 0 and 1. Consumers are distributed uniformly between [0,1]. (As considered in class:that is, for any two values b1 and b2 > b1 in [0,1] the number (or mass) of individuals withbi ∈ [b1, b2] is equal to b2 − b1.)a) Draw a graph illustrating the utility of different individuals (as a function of bi on thehorizontal axis) for the following given value of (Pa, Pb) = (2/3 , 5) . Indicate whichindividuals do not buy anything, which individuals buy the variety from firm A, andwhich individuals buy the variety from firm B.b) What is the value of bi for which an individual is indifferent between…
OA company has introduced a new product which is sold through an electronics retailer. The retailer has estimated that demand will depend on the final price (p) according to the demand curve: D=2,000,000−2000p. The production cost is $101 per product. a.What wholesale price should OA charge? At this wholesale price, what retail price should the retailer set? b.What are the profits for OA and retailer at equilibrium? c.If OA decides to discount the wholesale price by $32, how much of a discount should the retailer offer to customers if it wants to maximize its own profit? What are the changes in profitsof OA and retailer?
2. Assume consumers are uniformly distributed with density S (a measure of market size) on a circle with perimeter 1, and each consumer buys exactly one unit of the good. Transport costs are linear: a consumer situated at distance x away from a firm incurs a cost tx to go to that firm and return. Firms locate around the circle, each in one location, and produce the same physical good at the same unit cost c. There is a large number of potential entrants. Entry has a fixed cost of f. Assume that N firms have entered and we are at stage 2. Since firms are symmetric, we look for a symmetric equilibrium where all firms set price p. a) Calcluate the total demand for a given firm i's product. b) Calculate the price that all firms will charge.
Jonathan, Scott and Mitchell share a garage. All enjoy having the garage cleaned, regardless of who pays for cleaning. The graph below represents Jonathan, Scott and Mitchell’s individual demand for garage cleaning. The marginal cost of cleaning $3 per hour. The Lindahl prices for Jonathan, Scott and Mitchell are, respectively, $68/17, $17/17, and $4/85 per hour. $34/17, $17/17, and $0 per hour. None of these. $30/17, $15/17, $6/17 per hour. $0, $0, and $0 per hour.
The Doug’s Delicious Diner faces a demand curve for its daily special in which there are an equal number of potential buyers at every $0.20 price point between $8.00 and $6.00. If the marginal cost is $6.35, what price maximizes profits? Doug notices that at this price the unserved portion of demand are all senior citizens. If it offered a senior discount, how much should it be?
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
Suppose the market for auto insurance is made of up two types of buyers: high-risk and low-risk. Buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for auto insurance plans, and sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) when selling plans to each type of buyer, are outlined in a photo (a) In a world with perfect information, would the market for insurance plans clear? If not, why? If yes, what are some prices that would a llow both markets to clear? The prices in each market are allowed to differ Assume now that there is asymmetric information and that insurance companies do not know how risky an individual buyer is. In the face of this uncertainty, they determine that the probability that a “walk-in” is high-risk is 0.75. What is the minimum price sellers are willing to accept when selling an insurance plan? At this price, will low- and high-risk buyers both be willing to purchase this insurance plan? Explain. Be sure the mention adverse selection in your answer.
21

SEE MORE QUESTIONS

Recommended textbooks for you

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

Economics

ISBN:

9781305585126

Author:

N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…

Economics

ISBN:

9781259290619

Author:

Michael Baye, Jeff Prince

Publisher:

McGraw-Hill Education

SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS