Consider a Cournot model of a market with of two firms with differentiated products. Firm 1 has Cournot best response function qi(q2) = (150-3q2)/10 and has constant marginal cost of 100. Firm 2 has Cournot best response function q2(q) = (100-2q1)/3 and has constant marginal cost of 50. What are the firms' marginal revenue functions? 20. Firm I's Cournot equilibrium output level is 21. Firm l's Cournot equilibrium output level is

Consider a Cournot model of a market with of two firms with differentiated products. Firm 1 has Cournot best response function qi(q2) = (150-3q2)/10 and has constant marginal cost of 100. Firm 2 has Cournot best response function q2(q) = (100-2q1)/3 and has constant marginal cost of 50. What are the firms' marginal revenue functions? 20. Firm I's Cournot equilibrium output level is 21. Firm l's Cournot equilibrium output level is

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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