Assume there is a lake that is common property. Does common property exhibit both excludability and non rivalrous consumption? Suppose that fisherman use the lake but cannot sell their access rights. Each fisherman incurs individual costs in time and fishing equipment to take fish from the lake, yet the more fish taken makes it more costly for others to catch additional fish. Without regulation, the social costs are not being considered and the fish population is becoming critically low and unsustainable. What solutions exist to remedy this problem? Can access rights be assigned to fishermen? Should those rights be acquired for a fee? Can a fee per fish caught be charged? Can a permit system be devised that limits the number of fish caught per fisherman? Consider possible remedies and describe a solution that you think will be the most cost-efficient way to prevent the lake from being overfished. Don’t forget that enforcement measures come at a cost and an unmonitored system is subject to cheating!
Assume there is a lake that is common property. Does common property exhibit both excludability and non rivalrous consumption? Suppose that fisherman use the lake but cannot sell their access rights. Each fisherman incurs individual costs in time and fishing equipment to take fish from the lake, yet the more fish taken makes it more costly for others to catch additional fish. Without regulation, the
What solutions exist to remedy this problem? Can access rights be assigned to fishermen? Should those rights be acquired for a fee? Can a fee per fish caught be charged? Can a permit system be devised that limits the number of fish caught per fisherman?
Consider possible remedies and describe a solution that you think will be the most cost-efficient way to prevent the lake from being overfished. Don’t forget that enforcement measures come at a cost and an unmonitored system is subject to cheating!
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