As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand onweekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movietheaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P= 20 – 0.001Q, on weekdays, it is P= 15 - 0.002Q. You acquire legal rightsfrom movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty" for each moviegoer entering yourtheaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once).What type of pricing strategy should you consider in this case?O Third degree price discriminationO Block pricingO First degree price discriminationO Second degree price discriminationWhat price should you charge on weekends?Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.$What price should you charge on weekdays?Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.

Pricing Strategy is an apparatus used to fix the cost of a specific item or administration by…

As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie heaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P= 20 – 0.001Q, on weekdays, it is P= 15 – 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights rom movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty" for each moviegoer entering your heaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What type of pricing strategy should you consider in this case? O Third degree price discrimination O Block pricing O First degree price discrimination O Second degree price discrimination What price should you charge on weekends?

As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie heaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P= 20 – 0.001Q, on weekdays, it is P= 15 – 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights rom movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty" for each moviegoer entering your heaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What type of pricing strategy should you consider in this case? O Third degree price discrimination O Block pricing O First degree price discrimination O Second degree price discrimination What price should you charge on weekends?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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