Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=140-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p=120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices? The club maximizes profit subject to the policy by charging a per round price of and a lump-sum fee of p=$ F = $ (Enter your responses as whole numbers.)

Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=140-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p=120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices? The club maximizes profit subject to the policy by charging a per round price of and a lump-sum fee of p=$ F = $ (Enter your responses as whole numbers.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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